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FERDINAND MARCOS: APOTHEOSIS OF THE PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL POLITICAL TRADITION 
BY  
 
PROLOGUE 
 
 Gold surrounded Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the former First Lady who sat across me in 
her apartment explaining, “In terms of the Philippines, especially in the case of President 
Marcos and myself, we based ourselves on the role of man and woman, because of the 
cultural genesis of Adam and Eve.”1 She went on, clarifying, “From this there were 
doubts about whether women had souls; it was even suspected that Eve was the root for 
the word „evil‟.”2 Mrs. Marcos delineated the story of Genesis in order to introduce the 
framework through which she characterizes the roles that she and her husband assumed 
as First Man and Wife of the Philippines. These roles align with the essential gender and 
cultural conceptions she attributes to the Catholic Philippine mindset. She continued, 
outlining an inversion of the traditional story, “In the Philippines, the man was malakas 
(strong), the opposite of weak Adam, and the woman was maganda (beautiful), the 
opposite of evil Eve. During the term of Marcos‟s presidency, I was very criticized, but I 
followed the dream of Filipinos, to be beautiful while Marcos was strong.”3 
 Indeed, Ferdinand Marcos‟s strength distinguished him from the preceding 
politicians, largely cut from the fabric of corruption, cronyism, patronage, coercion, and 
fraud that comprises Philippine politics. I believe, however, that this tradition, though 
endemic, results from the specific colonial shaping of Philippine history – not preexisting 
Philippine culture. Despite his nearly 20-year rule, upon closer inspection, Ferdinand 
Marcos does not look so dissimilar from his kin. Not the aberration of the system, he was 
                                                 
1
 Marcos, Imelda. Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2008. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
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the apotheosis of the Philippine political tradition. Previous Philippine politicians had 
committed the same sins as Ferdinand Marcos, but never at such a national, prolonged, 
and vigorous level. Ferdinand Marcos was the perfection of the system, for he too is cut 
from the same cloth, born from the same political culture, and ascended through the same 
ranks of government. To his contemporary political class, Marcos departed from the 
mutual respect that accompanied the patronage system, where power merely passed back 
and forth in tacit agreement between the two political parties. To a cynic, however, he 
merely dared further than the rest to achieve the Philippine political dream. 
Towards the end of his life when lupus erythematosus ravaged him, Marcos 
himself seemed very concerned with how history would remember him. In his diary, 
which William Rempel describes as “a decidedly odd document blending history and 
myth,”4 Marcos wrote:  
I often wonder what I will be remembered in history for. Scholar? Military 
hero? Builder? The new constitution? Reorganization of government? 
Builder of roads, schools? The green revolution? Uniter of variant and 
antagonistic elements of our people? He brought light to a dark country? 
Strong rallying point, or a weak tyrant?
5
 
 
Such self-flattery is not misplaced given that God, in a dream, told Ferdinand Marcos to 
save his country and that he was “the only person who can do it … nobody else can.”6 
 Mrs. Imelda Marcos, who had initially characterized her husband as malakas, 
reminded me, “But at the same time, after Marcos became president, I asked him why he 
didn‟t institute the death penalty and he said, „The art and use of power is that it should 
                                                 
4
 Rempel, William C. Delusions of a Dictator: the Mind of Ferdinand Marcos as Revealed in His Secret 
Diaries. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993: xiv 
5
 Ibid., p. xii. 
6
 Ibid. 
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never be used, only felt.‟”7 Such wise restraint seems ironic given Marcos‟s use of 
violence and coercion; however, it does ring true with regards to his treatment of the 
judiciary. I will argue that it is above all Ferdinand Marcos‟s delicate and skillful 
manipulation of the Philippine Supreme Court that proves him to be the perfection of the 
system, not the aberration.  
Here, I do not primarily seek to assess what Marcos did for his country. I will 
assent that he did much good, particularly during the first three years of martial law. Nor 
will I deny that to many at the time, martial law seemed the proper response to the 
turbulent disarray of the 1970s Philippines, albeit repressive and heavy-handed. My 
research rests and is a comment on the particular historical tradition of Philippine politics, 
so I will contextualize President Marcos‟s 1972-1986 dictatorship within that perspective. 
I wish to intervene within the existing academic debate on the nature of this tradition and 
challenge the older scholarship, such as that of Carl Lande, which presents Philippine 
political history through a patron-client lens. Lande posits, 
In reflection of behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship 
system, the Philippine polity … is structured less by organized interest 
groups or by individuals who in politics think of themselves as members 
of categories … than by a network of mutual aid relationships between 
pairs of individuals. To a large extent the dyadic ties with significance for 
Philippine politics are vertical ones, i.e. bonds between prosperous patrons 
and their poor and dependent clients.
8
 
 
Instead, with regards to the political system, I wish to side with more recent 
characterizations, particularly John T. Sidel's 1999 work on "bossism" and Juan J. Linz‟s 
1998 version of Max Weber‟s “sultanism.” Sidel and Linz‟s theories dethrone the patron-
client framework, which places undue importance upon landholders, while also 
                                                 
7
 Marcos, Imelda. Personal Interview. 12 Aug. 2008. 
8
 Lande, Carl H. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale 
University, 1965. 
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emphasizing the role of American colonialism. Their vision is one of personalistic rule, 
with Marcos as the single, national “sultan” operating in a country of small, local 
“bosses.” 
I disagree, however, with Sidel‟s argument that Ferdinand Marcos is the 
aberration of the political tradition. The scholar Mark R. Thompson similarly argues, 
“Marcos broke the informal rules of Philippine democracy and later changed the game 
altogether by launching a dictatorship … it had survived until confronted with 
[Marcos].”9 While, Sidel writes,  
A national oligarchy … has further reinforced factional competition for 
the presidency and thwarted national-state based monopoly … preventing 
the national economy from falling into the hands of a single predatory 
boss … Longtime president Ferdinand Marcos was the only boss able to 
overcome these obstacles under conditions strikingly similar to those 
enjoyed by the small-town, district-level, and provincial bosses examined 
in [my] previous chapters … Marcos began his first term (1966-69) to 
extend the prerogatives of the presidency.
10
 
 
Though Marcos did achieve more than any other “boss,” I believe it is important to 
distinguish Marcos as very much within the system. My interpretation shifts the blame 
away from one individual operating within a flawed yet, largely, healthy system and 
instead, draws attention to failures of the system itself. 
Arguments that Marcos should be viewed as the master of the system do appear in 
the literature. The Philippine history scholar, Benedict Anderson, in his seminal work on 
“Cacique Democracy” reviews the formation of the Philippine democratic system and 
introduces Marcos as a historical inevitability. He writes,  
                                                 
9
 Linz, Juan J., and H.E. Chehabi, eds. Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998: p. 211. 
10
 Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999: p. 144. 
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[I]t was only a matter of time before someone would break the rules and 
try and set himself up as Supreme Cacique for Life … From one point of 
view, Don Ferdinand can be seen as the Master Cacique or Master 
Warlord, in that he pushed the destructive logic of the old order to its 
natural conclusion.
11
  
 
Anderson, however, also endorses the countervailing argument, writing, “But from 
another viewpoint, he was an original; partly because he was highly intelligent, partly 
because, like his grotesque wife, he came from the lower fringes of the oligarchy.”12 
From there, Anderson explains Marcos‟s unique excesses as a result of his non-elite 
standing and his understanding that “wealth serves power, and the key card is the state.”13  
I side with the argument that Marcos is the apotheosis of the tradition and further 
it by focusing on the role that the judiciary played in the Marcos regime. I argue that the 
Supreme Court‟s legitimation confirms that Marcos did not break the Philippine political 
system, but that rather, the tradition bent to include him. Unlike Anderson, who presents 
Marcos as a historical inevitability, I argue that external forces provided him with the 
tools necessary to establishing a dictatorship. Even long after colonialism, U.S. interests 
remain a factor in Philippine politics. Were it not for the “special relationship” with the 
United States and the Cold War context, the Philippine people and their judiciary may not 
have tolerated Marcos‟s abuses or bent the political tradition to include him. Along with 
the Supreme Court, the Cold War and the contemporaneous Southeast Asian trend 
towards more authoritarianism states equally legitimated Marcos‟s regime. 
Though Marcos‟s rule was far more extreme than any who had preceded him, the 
Supreme Court dutifully legitimated Marcos‟s every action. The judiciary was the most 
                                                 
11
 Anderson, Benedict. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams.” New Left Review 
I.169. (May-June, 1988): 3-31. 
12
 Ibid., p. 20. 
13
 Ibid. 
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respected branch of government prior to Marcos‟s reign and without destroying or 
reconfiguring the Supreme Court, Marcos was able to maneuver the judiciary and win 
their validation. Unfortunately, in times of crisis the judiciary is constitutionally weaker 
than the executive, however, even when Marcos gave them the chance to in Javellana v. 
The Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court did not defy him.  
Previous politicians repeatedly subverted the rule of law, but the magnitude of 
their actions never required judicial approval in the way that Marcos‟s did. Because 
Marcos was the extreme, it was only under him that the judiciary was put in a position to 
define the limits of this tradition. For this reason, the judiciary was hailed as a “powerful 
and independent institution,” despite the fact that corruption plagued Philippine politics.14 
Their inability to place the rule of law above Marcos, not only bends the Philippine 
political tradition to include Marcos, but also confirms what the Supreme Court never had 
to formally acknowledge before – that the system itself operates outside the rule of law. 
Placing Marcos within the Philippine political tradition requires an examination of 
the decisive colonial history that built that tradition. Through the lens of my apotheosis 
framework, I will examine the martial law regime primarily, but will also provide a 
historical narrative of the early Marcos years and the formative colonial history. Then, 
leaving aside the economic, humanitarian, and military aspects, I will dedicate my 
investigation of martial law to Marcos‟s obsession with maintaining an appearance of 
constitutionality. To this end, I will review the role and actions of the Philippine Supreme 
Court under martial law. I will examine how Marcos cornered the judiciary so that it 
served less as a check on his power and, rather, as a legitimizer of his power both 
                                                 
14
 Del Carmen, Rolando V. “The Philippine Judicial System Under the New Constitution and Martial 
Law.” Texas International Law Journal. 9. (1974): 143-155. 
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domestically and abroad. I will frame the larger implications of the judiciary‟s actions, 
both within the regime as a whole and as contextualized within the Philippine political 
tradition. 
The existing literature on the Marcos years of 1972-1986 is largely politically 
focused. The research examines the maneuvers of President Marcos and rarely grants 
primary attention to the judiciary. I will review the most important of Marcos‟s legal 
tactics relating to martial law, securing unchallenged rule, and creating an appearance of 
constitutionality. I will then investigate the Supreme Court‟s response to these identified 
actions. In this way, I seek to understand the capacity in which the sole statutory 
institution that Marcos left intact, operated and served the Philippine president versus the 
Philippine people at its most pivotal moment. I believe that my unique interview access 
to key historical Filipino figures provides an opportunity to review the history, deliver a 
fresh and informed argument within the debate, and leave a rich record of oral history. 
My contribution to the academic literature is not only my support for and 
development of the apotheosis framework, but also the oral history record I am leaving in 
the process. I conducted interviews with former President, Fidel V. Ramos, Ramos‟s 
daughter, Angel Ramos, Supreme Court Justice under President Corazon Aquino, Justice 
Florentino P. Feliciano, Congressman Teodoro Locsin, and the leading attorney, Ricardo 
J. Romulo, and leading constitutional scholar, Father Joaquin Bernas, who were both 
framers of the 1987 Constitutional. From the Marcos camp, I interviewed the former First 
Lady, Imelda Marcos, Justice Minister and Solicitor General under Marcos, Attorney 
Estelito Mendoza, Defense Minister under Marcos and the architect of martial law, 
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, and Presidential Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of 
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Government Corporate Council under Marcos, Hon. Manuel L. Lazaro. I‟ve interviewed 
the technocrat and Finance Minister under Marcos, Cesar Virata and a Greek 
businessman who married into the elite Lopez family, was a close friend to Senator 
Benigno Aquino, and a fervent Marcos opponent: Steve Psinakis. I‟ve also interviewed 
my father, who is from a pro-Marcos family, but was a strong critic and demonstrator 
against the Marcos regime: Stephen CuUnjieng. Lastly, from the U.S. diplomatic side, I 
interviewed the American Ambassador during the People‟s Power Revolution from 1984-
1987: Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth, and the Deputy Chief of Mission at the 
American Embassy in the Philippines: Ambassador Philip Kaplan.  
I understand the complications of using non-academic sources as analytical tools; 
instead, I will present my interviews as records from involved persons, who have devoted 
a lifetime of contemplation to Ferdinand Marcos and his place in Philippine history. 
Additionally, I will rely on US periodicals as my contemporary martial law years 
newspaper resources, because the Philippine newspapers are far less reliable due to 
Marcos‟s control of the press. Indeed, during this time period, Filipinos themselves 
regularly turned to American newspapers in order to obtain more accurate information 
about events at home. 
My personal family connection to the history continually reminds me that these 
were very much real events, not just the subject of academic debate, and demands that I 
ground the history. My grandparents, Ricardo and Helen CuUnjieng, were dear friends to 
Ferdinand and Imelda. Helen CuUnjieng was one of Imelda‟s “Blue Ladies,” her group 
of twenty-five young, wealthy, high-society women, who assumed a political role during 
the campaign and continued to frequent the palace and political circles once Ferdinand 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
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Marcos had been elected President. For some time Ricardo CuUnjieng used to play golf 
with Ferdinand every day, which was surely quite a feat given a dictator‟s demanding 
schedule.  
My grandparents; however, were not Marcos‟s economic cronies and their loyalty 
was not founded on financial ties. Besides social embarrassment, the appearance of 
family disunity, and a demonstration of CuUnjieng disloyalty to the Marcoses, Ricardo 
and Helen did not stand to lose anything when Stephen began protesting against Marcos. 
Nevertheless, Stephen‟s family betrayal profoundly changed the CuUnjiengs, the legacy 
of which shaped my understanding of the history and sparked my life-long interest in the 
topic. 
 
 
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09 
 
11 
CHAPTER ONE: THE MARCOS QUESTION  
FERDINAND E. MARCOS 
Ferdinand Marcos was born in Batac, Ilocos Norte in 1917 to a family involved in 
local politics. Marcos pursued law at the University of the Philippines, but was brought to 
court in 1935, during his final year of study, for the suspected murder of Julio 
Nalundasan. Mr. Nalundasan had defeated Ferdinand‟s father Mariano Marcos‟s bid for 
the House of Representatives district in Ilocos Norte. Then, merely two days later, 
Nalundasan was shot dead while brushing his teeth by his bathroom window. Ferdinand 
Marcos was trained in firearms and a prime suspect on an assumed motive of family 
vengeance.
15
  
Convicted by the Court of First Instance, Marcos studied for the bar examination 
while in jail and topped the bar – earning marks of 100 in criminal law, 100 in 
international law, 100 in legal ethics, 98 in civil law, 97 in procedural law, 97 in 
commercial law, and 95 in political law
16
 – gaining many sympathizers and admirers. 
Ferdinand Marcos, merely 23 years old at the time, defended himself brilliantly and the 
Supreme Court acquitted him of the crime in 1940. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos‟s 
protégé, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Justice, and the architect of martial law, 
reflects on his dear friend Ferdinand Marcos‟s rise, describing,  
[A] brilliant student, bar top notcher, he was a barrister par excellence and 
he became famous, he was written about by all the newspapers and 
magazines … Then after that the war broke out, he became an officer in 
the Philippine army and then integrated into the United States Army for 
                                                 
15
 Celoza, Albert F. Ferdinand  Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism. 
Westport: Praeger, 1997: 23. 
16
 Scores recorded from the official, framed certificate in Mrs. Imelda Marcos‟s apartment. 
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the Far East … went to Bataan … then he went through the death march17 
and was released and joined the underground again
18
 and earned more 
medals. After the war he ran for Congress, became a young congressman 
and … a star in the House of Representatives and then he ran for the 
Senate and he shined all the way through … he was marked to become 
president.
19
 
 
Beyond being a famed and tremendous legal mind, Ferdinand Marcos sought to 
paint himself as a war hero. He exaggerated his guerilla exploits and pitted himself as a 
courageous and proud nationalist against the postwar political backdrop of Japanese 
collaboration. Albert Celoza‟s account reports,  
[Ferdinand Marcos] had been awarded medals of recognition right after 
the war, but twenty years later he became the most decorated hero of the 
Philippines, eclipsing even the most recognized leaders of the resistance 
against the Japanese. It was contended that he received some nine medals 
in one day in 1963 from the President in order to dissuade him from 
running for the presidency himself.
20
 
 
Ferdinand Marcos did indeed run for president and won two terms, after which he 
prolonged his stay in power by imposing martial law. The multi-dimensional, largely ad 
hoc character of Marcos‟s presidency, due to the anti-dogmatic nature of personalistic 
rule, has given rise to academic conflict over how to categorize Ferdinand Marcos‟s 
regime.  
In 1988, David Wurfel, a canonical Philippine historian, characterized the early 
martial law years to be “authoritarian-technocratic,” the middle years of the late 1970s as 
“neopatrimonial,” and the end as a return to technocratic rule.21 Scholars such as Robert 
Stauffer in 1979 and Robin Broad, present Marcos as representing foreign strategic and 
                                                 
17
 The 1942 Bataan Death March was a horrendous Japanese war crime inflicted upon 75,000 American 
and Filipino prisoners of war. 
18
 Ferdinand Marcos had been a guerilla fighter against the Japanese. 
19
 Enrile, Sen. Juan Ponce. Personal Interview. 6 Aug. 2008. 
20
 Celoza, Albert F. Ferdinand  Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism. 
Westport: Praeger, 1997: 23. 
21
 Wurfel, David. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
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economic interests. As Gary Hawes observes, however, this framework fails to account 
for the opportunities Marcos gave to his cronies and the creation of export monopolies, 
which subverted the desires of the World Bank, IMF, and U.S. government.
22
  
Various scholarship, such as that of Belinda Aquino in 1987, approaches Marcos 
as a unique actor within the Philippine political tradition. Aquino argues, “While 
corruption has always been part of Philippine political life, it reached epidemic and 
flagrant proportions during the Marcos years,” and demonstrated “a certain pathological 
dimension,” that she believes warrants viewing personalistic rulers as necessarily distinct 
from other actors within the tradition.
23
 She explains that one must “look at the role of 
individual dictators themselves in the destruction of their own societies,” underscoring 
the unique aspects to Marcos rather than laying blame on the system itself.
24
  
Benedict Anderson‟s 1988 “Cacique Democracy” paper argues that “Don 
Ferdinand can be seen as the Master Cacique or Master Warlord, in that he pushed the 
destructive logic of the old order to its natural conclusion.”25 Anderson‟s interpretation, 
however, mixes the two sides of the debate and incorporates the role that he believes 
Marcos‟s non-elite background played in pushing him further than his elite predecessors. 
Anderson writes,  
But from another viewpoint, he was an original; partly because he was 
highly intelligent, partly because, like his grotesque wife, he came from 
the lower fringes of the oligarchy. In any case, he was the first elite 
Filipino politician who saw the possibilities of reversing the traditional 
flow of power … [A]lmost from the beginning of his presidency in 1965, 
                                                 
22
 Hawes, Gary. The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987. 
23
 Aquino, Belinda A. Politics of Plunder: The Philippines under Marcos. Quezon City: Great Books 
Trading and the University of the Philippines College of Public Administration, 1987. 
24
 Ibid., p. 83. 
25
 Anderson, Benedict. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams.” New Left Review 
I.169 (May-June 1988): 3-31. 
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Marcos had moved mentally out of the nineteenth century, and understood 
that in our time wealth serves power, and that the key card is the state.
26
 
 
Anderson‟s framework presents Marcos as the inevitable conclusion of the historical 
political tradition. The historical political tradition, however, does not necessarily predict 
that a Ferdinand Marcos should eventually appear. Marcos came to power during a very 
precise moment in history; the Cold War gave rise to many similar authoritarian, military 
regimes in Latin America and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. That the Philippine people 
would have allowed Marcos to so extend the limits of their historical political tradition 
without this context, due to his sheer will alone, is far less likely. 
 
THE PATRON-CLIENT LENS  
Academic scholarship in the 1960s tended to frame the Philippine political 
tradition through a patron-client lens, Carl Landé being the preeminent scholar of this 
category. Landé examines the nuances of the patron-client relationship, which he believes 
determined the shape of the particular political tradition. He explains, 
The heavy reliance placed upon dyadic relationships, both vertical and 
horizontal (i.e. between unequals and equals), and the relatively slight use 
made of organized groups capable of pursuing common goals helps 
explain the strong emphasis in the Philippines on the pursuit of particular 
rewards, including exemption from the application of laws, and the 
relatively slight interest in the achievement of categorical goals, such as 
general legislation. This, in turn, affects the nature of relationships 
between politicians at various levels of government, between politicians 
and administrators, and between politicians and the public at large. It also 
explains why those organized interest groups found in the Philippines take 
pains to avoid permanent identification with either political party.
27
 
 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Landé, Carl. Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics. New Haven: Yale 
University, 1964: 2-3 
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Later, political economy scholars of the 1970s, such as James C. Scott emphasized that 
patron-client relationships take root according to socioeconomic factors, highlighting the 
widening social inequality and failure of the state and villages to provide subsistence and 
security. Generally, however, the patron-client lens remained the dominant interpretation 
of Philippine politics, until more recent studies, which finally dared to break from this 
framework. These newer studies, such as “Bossism,” remove the importance placed upon 
the landowning elite class
28
 and pay fresh attention to the entrenched roles that violence, 
fraud, and local power monopolies have played over the last century.  
 
BOSSISM 
 John Sidel‟s “bossism” successfully contextualizes Third World local strongman 
rule. Written in 1999, Sidel rests his theory on Joel Migdal‟s 1988 study of the local 
strongman. Migdal theorizes that these local bosses employ effective “social control,” by 
“having themselves or their family members placed in critical state posts to ensure 
allocation of resources according to their own rules, rather than the rules propounded in 
the official rhetoric, policy statements, and legislation generated in the capital city.”29  
Sidel‟s theory, however, rejects the idea that the nature of Philippine society 
breeds local strongman rule. Sidel challenges such cultural analyses by evaluating the 
integral roles that state structures and violent coercion play in perpetuating this kind of 
governance. Sidel believes that the most “distinctive and decisive” force in the 
                                                 
28
 “More recent studies of the contributions of forest, mineral, and marine resource exploitation – and 
public land – to the process of capital accumulation in the Philippines cast considerable doubt on the 
centrality of private landownership in the generation of wealth.” (Sidel, 10) 
29
 Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988: 256. 
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entrenchment of bossism in the Philippines was the colonial experience under the U.S. 
He describes, particularly, “the subordination of an extremely underdeveloped state 
apparatus to elected municipal, provincial, and national officials in the American colonial 
era.”30 Sidel argues that,  
Bosses have emerged and entrenched themselves when and where the 
local political economy has lent itself most readily and most fully to 
monopolistic control, through illegal activities, nodal commercial and 
transportation chokepoints, public lands, and heavily regulated crops and 
industries. Insofar as such monopolistic control over the local economy 
has hinged on state-based derivative and discretionary powers, single-
generation mafia-style bosses have depended and heavily on superordinate 
power brokers for backing.
31
  
 
With regards to the Philippines, Sidel notes that the established, inter-rivaled 
national oligarchy long fostered continual factional competition for the presidency and 
funded opposition candidates. This prevented a “single predatory boss” from capturing 
the economy. Sidel then reviews Ferdinand Marcos as precisely such a “single predatory 
boss” and presents Marcos as the anomaly of the political tradition. Sidel notes that 
Marcos was successfully different from temporary lower bosses and other previous 
politicians due to his heightened access to and dependence upon foreign loans, his 
exploitation of government “development” opportunities, and the elite‟s increased 
reliance on government loans and favors.
32
 Sidel explains what Ferdinand Marcos single 
national-level bossism looked like from the declaration of martial law in 1972 to the 
People‟s Power EDSA Revolution in 1986, as follows:  
Freed from legislative interference, Marcos ruled by decree, centralizing 
national police forces under the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 
establishing quasi-government monopolies for major commodity exports, 
                                                 
30
 Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University 
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and parceling out regulatory and/or proprietary control over the other 
strategic sectors of the national economy…among a close circle of family 
members, cronies, and frontmen.
33
 
 
Though Marcos did all this to the greatest historical degree, however, none of these 
actions were new to Philippine politics.  
 
SULTANISM 
Max Weber first espoused the theory of sultanism and Juan J. Linz later 
developed it for application to the Marcos regime and others such as those in Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Iran, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Max Weber theorized sultanism to 
be an extreme form of patrimonial authority, explaining the relationship and distinction to 
be:  
Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by 
virtue of the ruler‟s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial 
authority; where indeed it operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it 
will be called sultanism ... [and] consists only in an extreme development 
of the ruler's discretion. It is this[,] which distinguishes it from every form 
of rational authority.
34
  
 
Then, elaborating, Juan Linz characterizes the ideal contemporary sultanistic regime to be 
when the rule is: 
[B]ased on personal rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated … by a 
mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his 
power without restraint … unencumbered by rules or any commitment to 
an ideology or value system. The binding norms and relations of 
bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by arbitrary personal 
decisions of the ruler, which he does not feel constrained to justify in 
ideological terms. As a result corruption reigns supreme at all levels of 
society ... The staff of such a ruler … [are] often … members of his 
family, friends, business associates, or individuals directly involved in 
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using violence to sustain the regime. Their position of authority in society 
derives merely from this relation.
35
 
 
Essentially, sultanism is the developed case of personal rule, differentiated by the 
ruler‟s fusion of private and public roles, its lack of a guiding ideology, and the lack of a 
rule of law. Indeed, even sultanistic regimes break their own norms due to the inherently 
arbitrary nature of personal rule. The lack of a uniting programmatic purpose, moreover, 
often leads sultanist rulers, such as Ferdinand Marcos, to fabricate an ideology as 
propaganda and implement it by „revolution‟ to remove the opposition and legitimize the 
regime.
36
 Thus, after declaring martial law in 1972, in order to quell the Communist 
threat, which was effectively eliminated by 1976, Marcos then justified martial law as the 
only means to create the revolutionary, socially just, and economically equitable “New 
Society” he claimed to seek.37  
The particular nature of the Marcos regime and its developmental context within 
the larger scope of local strongman rule in the Philippines, acutely resonate with 
sultanism and bossism, respectively. As Stephen CuUnjieng notes; however, “You have 
to understand, what in hindsight looks very logical or like progressive moves or steps … 
were improvised and were based on where there was push back and where there wasn‟t 
push back.”38 In this way, one should continue to evaluate debates and theories that 
attempt to explain history with a critical eye. There were no comprehensive, 
predetermined master plans for Marcos. He followed the letter of the law and the 
tradition, but continually pushed it further. For this reason, one recognizes the footsteps 
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of past politicians in all of Marcos‟s action, which is what allows for a pattern of moves 
or thought to be discerned. Rather than a master plan, however, the pattern aligns with 
historical precedents that join Marcos to the tradition.  
 
MARCOS IN RETROSPECT 
In a personal interview, I asked Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo, one of the framers of the 
1987 Philippine Constitution and a leading Philippine lawyer, whether he considered 
Ferdinand Marcos to be the extreme of the entrenched system, seeing in him the 
embodiment of all the ills already present in the political tradition or as an aberration of 
the system, breaking all the norms and departing from the tradition. Romulo concludes 
that Ferdinand Marcos truly was both, explaining, “[Marcos] was riding the course of 
history quite well and manipulated it to his advantage.”39 Analyzing the history and 
motives that led Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972, Atty. Romulo 
recounts, 
He was a brilliant man and a very, very clever politician, and I think what 
he did was both to look at the trends and manipulate some of it to his 
advantage. 1) He could not run again because he had had two terms 2) the 
Communist threat really was increasing and that was the time for 
radicalism … So I think he could see that he could manipulate [the] 
protest and radicalism to show enough danger to invoke martial law. 
That‟s how I would look at Marcos, not so much that he was an aberration, 
but … [as] the leader … at the right place at the right time in so far as 
autocratic rule … But ... the course of history really was, after [World War 
II] … trending to [autocracy] because of the communist threat [and the] 
inability of the presidents to solve economic problems. President Roxas 
died so soon, President Quirino had an excellent economic plan, but he 
was not a good leader; the opposition could run circles around him … 
Then there was [the] overall issue of collaboration with the Japanese 
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[during their wartime occupancy, which]
40
 emphasized nationalism … 
And Marcos, in the sidelines, having popularized himself as a guerilla 
leader, a hero, this and that, was able to take advantage … and present 
himself not only as a war hero but also as a nationalist.
41
 
 
Such perversion of the rules to suit his self-interest, essentially characterizes Ferdinand 
Marcos. Atty. Romulo focuses primarily on the historical circumstances that gave Marcos 
the opportunity to go further than his predecessors, rather than pointing to larger systemic 
failures within the political tradition. One should note that the lucky opportunity of this 
particular Cold War moment in history also lies upon a backdrop of endemic corruption 
and a precedent of power grabbing, which together gave Marcos the necessary tools for 
and very possibility of establishing a personalistic dictatorship. 
Substantiating Atty. Romulo‟s claims, Mark R. Thompson, a proponent of Juan J. 
Linz‟s sultanism and a recent scholar on the Marcos years, confirms that Ferdinand 
Marcos‟s lied about his “heroism and courage.”42 His tales about his experience as a 
guerrilla fighter against the Japanese were very much political tactics. Thompson ascribes 
this to the “Marcos style,” in which “any type of dissimulation or chicanery or bribery or 
coercion is applicable.”43 Thompson elaborates on Ferdinand Marcos‟s war tales, stating 
that,  
During the war Marcos had organized an Ilocano
44
 gang of „forgers, 
pickpockets, gunmen, and racketeers‟ engaged in extortion and the black 
market. He transformed his guerrilla group into a political machine that 
built up a constituency by claming war benefits from the U.S. government 
and got him overwhelmingly elected to Congress in 1949. The fake war 
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medals he received as a political favor a decade and a half later were 
evidence of how much influence he had gained in the legislature.
45
  
 
 When posed the same question as given to Atty. Romulo, Stephen CuUnjieng 
replied more decisively. Stephen had protested heavily against the Marcos regime until 
eventually the Marcoses personally requested that he leave the country in 1984. 
Reflecting on Marcos‟s position within the political context, Mr. CuUnjieng argues,  
He is the extreme of the system, because he came out of the system, he 
broke it after extending it, but he was a product of the system … and 
moved up legitimately … He wouldn‟t have been tolerated and accepted if 
he wasn‟t embodying qualities of the tradition.46  
 
Ferdinand Marcos did not immediately establish a dictatorship upon coming to power. He 
served his first term and built a strategy to secure a second term, which was a historical 
first, only after which did he resort to more drastic measures to remain in power.  
The former President, Fidel V. Ramos, who was the Chief of the Armed Forces, 
implementing martial law, and later the Secretary of National Defense, before ultimately 
becoming President of the Philippines in 1992, intimates a different inside opinion of 
Marcos. Ramos describes Marcos using language that strongly resembles that of Sen. 
Juan Ponce Enrile, demonstrating the country‟s uniform regard for Marcos‟s legal 
acumen, however, he then emphasizes the influence of the First Lady. Ramos explains,  
I think it is accurate [that Marcos is the apotheosis] in hindsight, because 
at the time [that] he was in wealth and power he appeared to be the most 
brilliant of all Filipinos in the 20
th
 century ... As a young student, top-
notcher of the Bar, he was brilliant and patriotic and as far as I can 
remember he was a good example for Filipinos, but then things changed 
after he assumed power. Now you may recall that in his first term … he 
really did a good job as President of the Philippines, then in his second 
term it was mixed in terms of the interest of the country as a whole, 
because he was already starting to plot how to prolong himself in power, 
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the result of which was martial law. It was mixed because more and more 
he came under the influence of the First Lady … being in the corridors of 
power for four years … put all kinds of ideas into his head and I think that 
was part of it. Some people wrote books … about the conjugal 
dictatorship.
47
 
 
Many believe that Imelda Marcos‟s desire to remain in power helped to drive Marcos 
down the path he eventually took. Mrs. Marcos‟s unabashed immoderation focused the 
spotlight on her. In contrast, Ferdinand Marcos was something of an ascetic, who did not 
indulge himself in the same fineries as his wife. However, one should also note that 
Marcos was very skillful at handling all those around him. In the same way that he 
married Imelda for political reasons, it has also been suggested that Marcos chose to paint 
her as the corrupt one to deflect attention away from himself.  
Amb. Stephen Bosworth, the US Ambassador to the Philippines from 1984-1987, 
differentiates Ferdinand Marcos from the other Filipino politicians of his time and 
tradition. Putting aside all theories, Bosworth simply places primary importance upon 
Marcos‟s desire to stay in power. Bosworth states plainly, “Marcos was much smarter 
than his contemporaries and more ruthless than his contemporaries and by the mid 1970s 
he was at a point when he could not envision any future for himself beyond being 
president of the Philippines.”48 Power, indeed, drove Marcos, but presidents before him 
had been equally power hungry, nevertheless, Marcos was the first to even win 
reelection. Marcos was more successful at the playing the same game, not only because 
of his greater prowess and daring, but also thanks to the Cold War context in which he 
came into power. 
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 Striking a very different note, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, Marcos‟s former Solicitor 
General and Minister of Justice, contextualizes Ferdinand Marcos, asserting,  
I think he practiced the same [patronage politics], but in a more 
sophisticated way. For example, it‟s because he was a leader and he‟s a 
dynamic leader and his leadership is real. He‟s not a leader simply because 
he‟s president, but because people believed in him. So he did not have to 
play the usual politics of patronage just like you have now.
49
  
 
The leadership that Mendoza admires in Ferdinand Marcos is incontestable, however, his 
subsequent argument does not follow quite as clearly. Mendoza draws a comparison to 
the current president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo‟s, pithy 500 peso patronage handouts, 
which he deems a waste of money. Mendoza highlights instead Marcos‟s construction 
projects, which garnered him much support.
50
 The Philippines is indeed indebted to 
Marcos for the vast infrastructure he built and improved, however, Mendoza‟s argument 
ignores the heavy patronage that was also a central tenet to Marcos‟s politics.  
The former Presidential Legal Counsel to Ferdinand Marcos, Hon. Manuel 
Lazaro, who like Atty. Mendoza remains vigilantly pro-Marcos, also notes the superlative 
leadership that Ferdinand Marcos embodied. Lazaro goes still further to champion 
Marcos as a true aberration from the cycle, declaring, 
He was able to change the political and domestic landscape in so many 
ways … First of all, there were no elections for a long time … I have a 
strong feeling [that was because] he wanted people to have more 
discipline, so he could emphasize the value of good leadership. He was 
able to dismantle goons, armies … With his entry, there were no more 
warlords. Elections were only for local elections and this time anybody 
with talents, without money, could run.
51
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Lazaro‟s benevolent depiction of Ferdinand Marcos subscribes to the belief that Marcos 
was creating a “New Society,” which Marcos himself presented in revolutionary terms. In 
this light, Marcos‟s true intent was not to prolong his stay in power, but to change and 
discipline Philippine society. Ultimately, despite his blatant desire for power, Marcos did 
too wish to instill a discipline that he believed Philippine society lacked. 
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile shares Hon. Lazaro‟s understanding of Marcos‟s intent. 
Though Enrile eventually broke with Marcos immediately prior to the EDSA revolution, 
Enrile states that he did so “as a matter of self-protection, self-preservation.”52 Enrile 
explains that he feared an assassination attempt on his life should a military junta 
successfully overthrow Marcos, who was gravely ill at the time and unable to defend his 
position.
53
 Despite his ultimate defection, it is evident that Marcos remains a hero to 
Senator Enrile. When posed the same question as to Marcos‟s place within the Philippine 
political tradition, however, Enrile evidences a far more realistic understanding of martial 
law than others from the Marcos camp. As Enrile explains, 
 Well he was skillful in playing the game and he inserted himself into the 
elite group because he was not really a member of the elite. He cultivated 
the friendship of the elite, and inserted himself. He was accepted, and in a 
sense, for a while, he allowed himself to become a tool of the elite ... At 
the same time, he was also planning for himself and when the time came, 
that‟s why I suspect, I do not know this for a fact, but I would imagine that 
he wanted to try to control the elite in the country so then when he 
declared Martial Law it leveled off the political and social playing field. 
But, there are many imponderables in the life of men; he got sick and he 
wasn‟t able to accomplish his purpose. In the mean time, absolute power 
corrupts absolutely, [his] relatives started to enjoy power and they thought 
that it would be infinite and endless and so corruption set in and that 
eroded the popularity of Marcos, eroded the popularity of his regime, and 
it ended up in the EDSA Revolution of 1986 … [Due to his sickness, he 
was not able to complete his] control of the people around him. I think if 
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Marcos had not suffered that sickness that early, he would have succeeded 
in pushing through his vision of the country … to make this country 
great.
54
 
 
Senator Enrile‟s loyalty, in this way, resembles the brand of loyalty that most of 
the pro-Marcos camp maintains. Enrile was Marcos‟s right hand man, he was involved in 
almost all facets of Marcos‟s rule, thus, Enrile does not erase the facts of Marcos‟s 
corruption or self-interest from his memory. Similarly, others such as Hon. Lazaro and 
Atty. Mendoza remain clear eyed about the nature of Marcos‟s regime, but it does not 
destroy their intrinsic belief that Marcos is a hero and that he sought to make the 
Philippines great.  
Asked what he judges Marcos‟s intention in declaring martial law to be, Mendoza 
replies, “I think … martial law, [though] initially, was only [enacted] to quell a rebellion 
… became an instrument of reform, because of his instant power to enact laws.”55 Then, 
pressed as to whether martial law lasted so long because it became an instrument of 
reform, Mendoza admits, “Well, let‟s just say, maybe, [it was also] what he thought … 
was necessary to keep [himself] in power.”56 Yet, this realization does not prevent 
Mendoza from championing the Marcos years as “the most productive [period] in good 
legislation.”57 Mendoza even asserts that, “it‟s … ironic that [Marcos is] called a 
dictator.”58 In this way, to those such as Lazaro and Mendoza, Marcos does not need to 
be forgiven for his sins and the fact that he committed sins does not negate his greatness. 
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Despite his hero status, Marcos cannot be held to unreasonable moral standards, 
contradictory to the historical political tradition. 
 
THE NATURE OF POLITICS 
Speaking from the staunchly anti-Marcos side, Congressman Teodoro “Teddy 
Boy” Locsin, Jr., descendant of a long active political family, a former journalist, a 
personal student of President Marcos,
59
 and a speechwriter for several presidents 
beginning with President Corazon Aquino, believes that “Marcos is not the apotheosis of 
any system, he was just a guy who took advantage of the sense of limitations of every 
other member of the senatorial class.”60 Congressman Locsin elucidates the nature of the 
political culture, explaining,  
Our political tradition really was that of a senatorial class. There were 
families that were in politics and you knew [who they were]. I think they 
took advantage of their position more to protect what they had. There were 
some families who were clever and were able to take advantage of 
national policies like the reparations. The Madrigals may have made a 
fortune there, but remember they were not in politics
61
 … Everyone 
waited for his turn in power, but there were things that you did not do to 
each other: you never shot each other, you respected each other‟s 
privacy.
62
  
 
The grave toll that the Marcos years took on his family explains Congressman Locsin‟s 
position. His is a historically political family, therefore, rather than denouncing the entire 
political tradition that his family helped to build, he instead emphasizes its limits. Certain 
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rules did govern the political tradition: power tacitly passed back and forth between the 
elite factions and killings took place on a local, not national, level, but a true rule of law 
did not exist. Marcos thus differed from the rest only in superficial terms, but in kind, he 
very much resembles the others of the senatorial class. 
Congressman Locsin recounts a story about Jaime “Banjo” Laurel, the son of the 
House Speaker Jose Laurel Jr. and the black sheep of the family, who had a “tendency to 
shoot people in nightclubs.”63 One day, Jaime Laurel‟s wife was shot dead and the Locsin 
family‟s publication Free Press, the oldest political newspaper in the Philippines, 
published part one of the story, but Congressman Locsin explains,  
[B]efore part two could come out, Speaker Jose Laurel, who was living 
two streets away, suddenly shows up at our breakfast table and we‟re 
supposed to be going to school, but my father‟s there having breakfast. So 
[Laurel] sits down [and eats]. And my father called up the office and said 
part two [would] not come out, because you can never attack a man who 
breaks bread at your table; that‟s just the way it was before. Sometimes 
that‟s good, sometimes that‟s bad, but I think overall it was good because 
nobody ever exceeded [his/her] limits. That was all destroyed by Marcos 
… [The others] would never dream of doing what he did, because it was 
out of the rules … that‟s why he was able to do it. He was able to get 
control of the army, he was able to build up a regional officer class – 
mostly Ilocanos – isolate the southerners, and lay the groundwork for 
military takeover, which is what he did and he destroyed the entire 
republican class. In thirteen years
64
 it disappeared; the children of that 
class are not in politics anymore.
65
 
 
Congressman Locsin also points to several lingering vestiges of this old 
republicanism in Ferdinand Marcos. In addition to being a legendary legal mind and 
wishing always to portray an appearance of legality to his rule, Congressman Locsin 
attests that Marcos continually went through the charade of fake elections, because he 
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inherently thought it was improper not to. This was not a move towards more sincere 
democracy, merely a superficial observation of tradition. Congressman Locsin further 
recounts,  
We later found out that he never actually touched the national treasury, 
although we overthrew him on that condition, that he was stealing from 
the government. He would take kickbacks from Japanese contractors etc., 
but we found out that he didn‟t touch the national treasury, that‟s another 
throwback of his, that you use your power to enrich yourself but you never 
put your hand in the public till, which is the way it was in the old 
Republic.
66
  
 
Though this may be a specious definition of stealing, Congressman Locsin‟s point only 
further reveals Ferdinand Marcos as being within the system, rather than without. Marcos 
clearly was not trying to overstep certain traditional boundaries, though pushing the 
limits of what had been done before. 
 Amb. Philip Kaplan, the Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d‟Affaires to the 
Philippines‟ U.S. Embassy during the transition after Marcos to the Aquino 
administration, once asked President Marcos why he permitted all the corruption in his 
government. Kaplan confides that, in summary, Marcos explained that were he to remove 
of all of his so-called cronies, his whole support system would break down, and that he 
was effectively running a feudal operation.
67
 Indeed, the former Senate President Jose 
Avelino admitted with shocking honesty, “We are not angels! What are we in power for? 
When Jesus Christ died on the Cross, He made the distinction between a good crook and 
the bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.”68 While serving in her cabinet, 
Congressman Locsin says that President Aquino once told him:  
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If you‟ve never knelt with a rosary and prayed for every single vote, 
thinking you‟ll be cheated, you‟ve never gone door to door begging for a 
vote, knowing you couldn‟t buy them all, then you don‟t understand what 
we politicians live.
69
  
 
The Filipino people had no expectation that Ferdinand Marcos would follow the 
law. The apotheosis of the system, he extended the law, through complex legal and 
political tactics, to expand the definition of the entire political power game. In the 
beginning, the public largely supported him, though strong opposition built against him 
during his second term. When Marcos eventually declared martial law at the end of his 
second term, however, the public thanked him for doing so. The Supreme Court 
supported him in this and when he dared further, flagrantly violating the provisions of the 
Constitution, they were unable to challenge him. Rather than rejecting him as 
overstepping the boundaries of the political tradition, the Court‟s decision extended the 
limits to include him. The rule of law had never governed politician‟s actions. The 
Supreme Court‟s legitimation only continued to afford Marcos the same protection from 
constitutional constraints that previous politicians enjoyed for less excessive violations. 
Understanding the nature of Philippine politics requires revising one‟s understanding of 
politics altogether, for the government never played by its own rules. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEFINING HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES  
AMERICAN COLONIAL POLITICAL TUTELAGE 
 To expose Marcos as the perfection of the Philippine political tradition requires an 
examination of the nature of the system, paying particular attention to its formation and 
entrenchment. To this end, academic articles on Philippine politics commonly begin with 
acknowledgment and praise of the country‟s long experience with democracy. Paul 
Hutchcroft writes, “No country in Asia has more experience with democratic institutions 
than the Philippines. Over more than a century … Filipinos know both the promise of 
democracy and the problems of making democratic structures work for the benefit of 
all.”70 However, Atty. Romulo contests that,  
Philippine democracy was always a façade. It worked at first because the 
Americans were always around, but it was built on the notion that if you 
had elections you had democracy, but the institutions were not there – it 
was always patronage. Family loyalty was number one, regional loyalty 
was number two – these were vestiges of feudalism … So it really was not 
a showcase for democracy, because from the very beginning the values 
were imported and didn‟t embed themselves in our culture.71  
 
The former Minister of Education, Culture, and Sports, O.D. Corpuz, extensively 
studied Philippine colonial history and his work supports Atty. Romulo‟s view. Corpuz 
articulates the dissonance between the “suprastructure” of political values that the U.S. 
gave the Philippines and the “infrastructure” of traditional attitudes that the Filipinos 
applied to those values: 
 In the suprastructure the dominant attitudes and values are: a confidence in 
the potency of the individual to solve his own problems; a high respect for 
individual achievement; stress on technical expertise and impersonal 
rationality in the social management of public affairs; and a technique of 
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enforcing social responsibility through impersonal legal rules. The 
infrastructure, on the other hand, has among its components a reliance 
upon primary groups, especially kinship groups, in the solution of the 
individual‟s problems; a high respect for social status rather than 
individual achievement or merit; an emphasis on primary interest-groups 
as against the interests of the individual or of the vague national 
community; and a style of social morality based on personal, traditional, 
or ethical (nonlegal) norms.
72
 
 
Though there is always a certain disconnect between suprastructure and 
infrastructure, the lack of genuine democracy makes the difference between the American 
and Filipino cultures staggering and speaks to the difficulties of importing a political 
system, as Atty. Romulo notes. To this point, past executive positions in the Philippines 
prior to the U.S. influenced 1935 Philippine Constitution indicate that though the 
Philippine conception of the presidency was in keeping with that of the Americans, a 
separation of powers was not. Filipinos were as yet unaccustomed to separated branches 
of government. Filipinos, furthermore, generally distrusted executive power due to their 
strong historical reasons for doing so under the Spanish governor-generals who served 
the Spanish crown.
73
 
At the beginning of the American colonial period in 1898, the Philippines had no 
meaningful experience with national democracy or political parties. The counter-Spanish 
revolutionary period produced the Malolos Congress and Malolos Constitution, the latter 
of which drew from both the American and English model and was an eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment influenced document committed to individual rights according to natural 
law.
74
 William Howard Taft led the Second Philippine Commission,
75
 establishing a civil 
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government in 1901, wherein the commission acted as both the cabinet and legislature 
with Taft as the first governor-general of the Philippines.
76
 President McKinley‟s 
“Instructions to the Philippine Commission” hollowly reminded Taft that “The 
Commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is 
designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the 
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands.”77 Notably, 
President McKinley also stressed,  
The people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there 
are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis 
of our governmental system … that there are also certain practical rules of 
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of 
these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and 
these rules of government must be established and maintained in their 
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may 
conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are 
familiar.
78
  
 
In practice, the colonists on the ground were in round agreement that the Filipino peoples 
were savage and ignorant. Thus, the colonists did not seek the Filipinos‟ consent or aim 
to adapt the American governmental system to their customs and traditions.
79
 
The Americans built upon the Spanish governmental institutions and from 1900-
1913, as the first Philippine governor-general, U.S. Secretary of War, and eventually U.S. 
President, William Howard Taft supported a “policy of attraction.” This policy awarded 
political opportunities to the established economic elite while Taft encouraged the 
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American model of strong local government.
80
 Yet, the economic elite was not 
necessarily destined to inherit political prominence. As Benedict Anderson states, “It was 
above all the political innovations of the Americans that created a solid, visible „national 
oligarchy.‟”81 Taft and other American colonials stated that “the masses [were] ignorant, 
credulous, and childlike” and they severely limited suffrage, protected elite dominance, 
and opposed potential popular mobilization against their established order.
82
 In this way, 
it was the particular historical circumstances of the American colonial rule, rather than 
Philippine culture, that largely determined the subsequent political trajectory. 
 
“A RAPIDLY „FILIPINIZED‟ STATE APPARATUS” 
In 1902, Philippine municipal officials elected the provincial governors, 
incorporating municipal politics into the larger provincial politics and new, intricate 
intraprovincial allegiances formed. In 1907, Taft‟s commission became an appointed 
upper house as an elected Filipino legislature came into being, dominated by the newly 
created Nacionalista party.
83
 The electorate was elite and limited, amounting only to 3% 
of the population. The U.S. invited males at least twenty-three years of age, who had held 
municipal office before August 13, 1898, were literate in Spanish or English, and paid 
annual tax or owned at least $230 worth of property, to directly elect their provincial 
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governors.
84
 In doing so, the provincial loyalties and factions grew deeper still, forming 
what would become the premise for the later national assembly elections. The U.S. 
Congress enacted the Jones Law in 1916 authorizing a bicameral legislature to be elected 
by all literate males. Though the legislature was not yet fully elective, the Jones Law did 
expand the electorate. By 1920, the American colonists had effectively given up direct 
control of the Philippines, but preserved great economic, military, and foreign policy 
related influence.
85
  
The political system was extremely exclusive but offered rapidly larger political 
positions, however, the American colonists failed to build a strong bureaucracy to 
accompany these expanding opportunities. Sidel describes the legislature gaining control 
over “a hastily constructed and rapidly „Filipinized‟ national state apparatus.”86 The 
colonists focused on holding elections, forming representative institutions, and 
mobilizing nascent political parties. Without an effective bureaucracy, however, these 
institutions fell prey to the detrimental patronage system of the Philippine provinces. 
Sidel cites, moreover, that American colonial officials observed that the municipal police 
forces were merely “the political henchmen, and in too many instances the personal 
muchachos of the presidentes and local bosses.”87 This situation differs from the regional 
advances that took place in other Southeast Asian countries at the time, as in, for 
example, Indonesia‟s experience under the Dutch.88 In Indonesia, the Dutch expanded the 
state, bureaucratized the apparatus, and centralized the entire governmental system with 
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greater tutelage and organization for their colonial subjects. After 1920, however, such 
centralization did give way to harsh authoritarianism in Indonesia. 
Many Filipinos suffered and fought desperately for independence from Spain. 
When the Americans arrived, nationalism had been growing, particularly following the 
execution of the independence hero, Jose Rizal. The colonists sought to deafen this 
sentiment. Scholar Albert F. Celoza reports, “the display of the Philippine flag was 
banned and advocacy of independence was prohibited during the first years of American 
occupation, but through theater and music, anti-American feelings were expressed.”89 
Atty. Romulo discusses both colonial powers, explaining,  
The struggle against Spain – that was genuine, blood was spent there, 
many died, many were persecuted – then the Americans came in, who we 
thought were liberators, and promptly double-crossed us … The trouble 
the Americans brought was [that] – though from a colonial power it [was] 
smart – they soon gathered the elite and made them collaborators and with 
that retained the old power structure that the Spanish had put in place. 
That was anti-democratic, but the colonial administrator is only interested 
in pacification. The elite had the power structure to resist [the Americans] 
some more if they wanted to, so [the Americans] quickly collared all of 
them and made them their own. So you really left a vast number of people 
outside of the system, which is the way it has always been even up to 
now.
90
  
 
In this way, the Philippine political system developed, but it never matured past the 
impediments that colonialism placed upon it. Rather than building a popular, 
representative body to serve the will of the people, the elites further entrenched 
government as their exclusive domain.  
Taft‟s government successfully dismantled the friar estates, while his civilian 
bureaucracy sought to win over the landed elite from their revolutionary fight. Dangling 
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the bait of political power did, indeed, successfully enervate Philippine nationalism. 
Ultimately, however, the Americans created a political system that catered entirely to the 
elite. Collaboration with the Americans cemented the oligarchy‟s power and created a 
dependent economic relationship with the U.S. that discouraged Philippine economic 
diversification or industrialization.
91
  
The American colonial period did, nevertheless, decouple the Catholic Church 
from politics, establish the importance of elections, create a strong presidency, and form 
political parties. The institution of a strong presidency resulted from its modeling after 
the role of the Commonwealth governor-general, which the first Commonwealth 
President, Manuel Quezon, would be able to exploit later in 1935.
92
 Over time, the 
electoral process took root and conferred legitimacy upon the chosen leaders. Until 1901 
when the U.S. established a civil government, no political parties had existed.
93
 
According to Wurfel, however, “Indigenous values entered the political process through 
parties and elections to a degree not possible in the bureaucracy and other formal 
institutions modeled on western lines.”94 The negative consequences of the elite-
dominated process and the primacy upon kinship ties and patronage would only become 
apparent later. It was clear by the 1930s; however, that the party system had,  
[M]erely strengthened the political hold of dominant, landed families, 
which had used quasi-feudal techniques to gain an electoral following and 
could hold national power through a system of one-party dominance. At 
the national level, as a result, mass interests could not be articulated.
95
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Thus, even when in 1951 the electorate expanded dramatically to 4.7 million registered 
voters due to the abolishment of the literacy requirement, as Wurfel writes, “the 
dominance of the newly created national oligarchy was so well entrenched that 
challenges from below – motivated by deep social injustices – faced monumental 
odds.”96  
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
PATRONAGE POLITICS 
 Utang na loob (“the exchange of services and goods between individuals 
belonging to two different groups.”97) is the embedded social value of reciprocity that 
underlies Philippine culture and has colored much of Philippine politics. Such reciprocity 
is evident in underdeveloped, dependent community structures, and due to the halted 
development of the Philippines, continues to permeate political interactions there today. 
Ambassador Stephen Bosworth comments,  
There is a lot about Philippine culture that hasn‟t changed [throughout the 
history of the political tradition], the government in place now is evidence 
of that.
98
 The reality of the Philippines is that it is … organized vertically; 
people on top take care of the people under them and the people under are 
loyal to the people on top. There is very little horizontal organization of 
society in the Philippines, so popular action is very difficult to mount. It 
happened to some extent in the 1986 revolution in that, that act of getting 
rid of Marcos brought together various classes and regions in a way that 
hadn‟t happened before ... But Filipino politicians try to take advantage of 
this vertical organization; political parties are ineffective and politics tends 
to be, by and large, personal- this is a classic example of utang na loob.
99
  
 
This cycle of favor and debt is the currency for earning a living and socially advancing in 
the Philippines, because individuals must trade through the established system in order to 
progress.
100 Termed “dyadic alliances” in anthropology studies, in 1964 Carl Landé 
fleshed out their relevance to the nominal two party system of Philippine democracy. In 
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this system, there are no ideological or programmatic differences between parties, merely 
rival alliances, which prove to be shallower still given the frequent turncoatism.  
Without party loyalty or ideological counterpoints to shape policies, the branches 
of government remain truly separated as they are not accountable for leading “responsible 
party government” in order to win reelection. This renders the President unable to depend 
on legislative support from his party and he/she is thus severely weaker than the 
constitutionally vested powers suggest.
101
 This observation rings true with regards to 
Ferdinand Marcos, who easily switched from the Liberal party to the Nacionalista party, 
in order to run for president. Such political action further conforms Marcos to the 
particular political tradition of the Philippines. 
 For their part, the electorate does not commit to parties and instead votes 
according to personality or loyalty. Eric Gutierrez views this in terms of class, explaining,  
Philippine politics has not yet reached that maturity where class interests 
are aggregated into political parties … People and political actors down to 
the grassroots level, regardless of class origin or interest group, usually 
align or identify themselves with political clans that could best dispense 
patronage and access to power.
102
  
 
To this end, Albert Celoza writes, “Campaign slogans [took] the place of policies. Vote 
buying and bribery were rampant and worked effectively during elections. Promises of 
favors abounded. Pecuniary benefits were enough to induce desired behavior. In an 
economy of scarcity, the utmost concern is survival.”103 The majority of the electorate, 
however, will understandably have no taste for elevated policies so long as their chief 
concern remains daily survival.  
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Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner‟s review of local Philippine politics describes the joys 
and disappointments that follow municipal elections. She writes that the supporters of the 
winning party become utang na loob creditors, collecting their reward.
104
 The most 
vigorous campaigners can relax knowing that no punishment will follow should they 
conveniently forget to pay their taxes.
105
 Then, the opposition predictably accuses the 
incumbent party of corruption and abuse of public office for personal and familial gains. 
Unfortunately, however, that is precisely what the general public had expected in the first 
place.
106
 Thus, Marcos‟s heightened corruption and cronyism did not break the political 
system, but merely confirmed it. 
 
THE FAMILY STATE 
 Utang na loob may provide the language to explain the political and economic 
transactions of the Philippines, but to appreciate the higher order that mandates 
Philippine politics, one must recognize the power of the Family State. This cultural lens 
forms a large component of the established scholarship on Philippine history and though 
essentialist cultural analyses are mostly flawed due to their determinism, the supreme role 
that the Philippine family plays is incontestable. Stephen CuUnjieng recounts that while 
protesting directly alongside Corazon Aquino, Mrs. Aquino herself, upon realizing who 
Stephen CuUnjieng was, asked, “What is he doing here? He should not be here.”107  
The CuUnjiengs were not financially, but merely socially, tied to the Marcoses, 
thus Stephen CuUnjieng‟s actions did not affect his family‟s welfare. Yet, Mr. CuUnjieng 
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explains, “The view of right and wrong in this country is only secondarily moral, it‟s 
primarily tribal. When I was demonstrating nine out of ten people said „How could you?‟ 
not because it was wrong, but because my parents were close to Marcos.”108 Therefore, 
even Corazon Aquino, who eventually ousted Marcos and championed her cause on 
moral grounds, was, herself, unable to place morality above family. Aquino‟s comment 
demonstrates the classic Filipino understanding of loyalty, which dictates that, for right or 
wrong, it should in all circumstances lie with one‟s family. This particular limitation is 
not a product of American colonialism, but a cultural feature that matured under Spanish 
colonialism. Spanish familial ties bear a strong resemblance to that of Filipinos, but the 
nature of colonialism, with a limited, immature political system ruling a tribal country 
based on kinship ties, ultimately made such ties a handicap in the Philippines. 
The paradigm of strong families and a weak state traditionally features in much of 
the academic scholarship on several Southeast Asian countries and extends to the former 
Spanish colonies of Latin America. Jean Grossholtz describes the family unit in the 
Philippines to be “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the 
individual and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands.”109 While the 
family reliably assures social survival, in the space of a century the Philippines 
experienced the tumult of five republics, three empires, and accompanying revolutionary 
and World Wars. This instability only further drove Filipino trust away from government. 
When the United States awarded the Philippines their long-awaited independence, the 
central government failed to seize and defend their power against the muscle of the local 
governments who delivered national politicians their votes. The local politicians 
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effectively became like the warlords that had long ruled the provinces and gained 
veritable autonomy while reigning over the provincial population with terror and abuse of 
the utang na loob understanding.  
Thus, as Alfred McCoy notes, “After generations of experience Filipinos have 
learned to rely upon their families for the sorts of social services that the state provides in 
many developed nations.”110 In An Anarchy of Families, McCoy highlights the Articles of 
the Philippine Civil Code, which express the integral Filipino respect for the family unit. 
McCoy also notes the “curiously loving language” of Article 216, which states: “The 
family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.”111 Article 
219, additionally, delineates the supreme role that family plays in social welfare: “Mutual 
aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family. 
Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.”112 The powerful 
Catholic Church also has its hand in both politics and social welfare, but it is the family 
that “provides employment and capital, educates and socializes the young, assures 
medical care, shelters its handicapped and aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its 
name, honor, lands, capital, and values to the next generation.”113  
With regards to the elite families
114
 that monopolize the political and economic 
landscape, it is believed that in tandem to wealth and privilege, the succeeding 
generations inherit the character and values long associated with their family name. 
National trust and respect, therefore, continues through generations alongside control, 
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which only further advantages the politicians that descend from the country‟s most elite 
brands. Filipinos define family bilaterally rather than patrilinearly, joining a wife‟s family 
line to her husband‟s and with each generation the family network and consciousness 
only strengthens. This gives rise to the common belief among the elite that “everyone is 
related.” Within politics, however, this extensive and flexible familial landscape gives an 
impression of volatility, wherein, “elections often assume a kaleidoscopic complexity of 
coalition and conflict” concerning factional inter-elite differences.115  
Macroscopically, Filipino politics remain steadfast and stable, having resided in 
the hands of the elite for over a hundred uninterrupted years. Indeed, Carl Landé writes, 
“the two parties were essentially competing factions of actually only one „party‟, a ruling 
elite that had the same social conditions, the same political norms and the same programs 
of government.”116 With the notable exception of six Democratic Alliance candidates 
elected in 1948, nearly all national elected officials from 1946 to Ferdinand Marcos‟s 
declaration of martial law in 1972, were from families possessing considerable influence 
over local elections in their respective provinces.
117
 Even the exception proved to be 
tragedy. As punishment for the Democratic Alliance officials‟ foolish belief that they too 
could take part in politics, Congress expelled them on the grounds of alleged fraud and 
campaign violence. More tragic still, in 1948 the Supreme Court upheld their removal 
and denied them their seats in the House of Representatives. 
 The privatization of public resources empowers the dominant political and 
economic elite while diminishing the state apparatus and its resources. A legacy of the 
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colonial bureaucratic mandates, the weak state provided for the entrenchment of the elite 
families in the economy and politics. In particular, this was due to the emasculation of the 
central government at the hands of their local counterparts and the growing share of 
“rents” within the national economy.118 The theory of rent seeking describes the severe 
market entry restrictions and virtual monopolies that the state grants only to the few, 
which sparks elite competition or “rent-seeking”.  Due to the colonial context that 
established and directed the state‟s evolution, the national government is a feeble 
apparatus for economic development, thus rendering it beholden to the rent-seekers that it 
caters to.
119
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CHAPTER FOUR: PAVING THE ROAD TO MARCOS 
PROVIDING FOR MARTIAL LAW 
 Estado de sitio (state of siege) was the colonial Spanish equivalent of martial law, 
though on no occasion was it imposed.
120
 Neither was it provided for in the Malolos 
Constitution of the First Philippine Republic, which only lasted a short six-month run. 
Section 21 of the Jones Law was the Philippines‟ true introduction to martial law. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1905, Governor-General James F. Smith, under the authority of the 
Philippine Bill of 1902, suspended the writ of habeas corpus for the first time in 
Philippine history.
121
 The Jones Law ascribed such powers to the governor-general and 
the provision bears nearly the precise language later used in the 1935 Philippine 
Constitution‟s Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2:  
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the 
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such 
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, 
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof; when the public 
safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
122
 
 
Unlike the United States, the Philippines explicitly vested this power in the executive.
123
 
Congressman Locsin reasons that as a new country, the Philippines required more 
specific articulation of emergency powers than the U.S. Constitution delineated.
124
 As a 
consequence, under Ferdinand Marcos, initially it was not that the Supreme Court was 
supine, but that in cases of martial law, the judiciary does not enjoy the same prerogatives 
as the executive. 
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Though there was unanimous support among the 1935 Constitutional Convention 
delegates to grant the President the control of the armed forces in the case of danger, 
there was serious contention as to whether the power to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus should reside with the executive or legislative branch.
125
 In 1934 Delegate 
Salvador Araneta wished to amend the martial law provision to provide for the National 
Assembly to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when public safety required it. He 
proposed that the power reside with the President only if the National Assembly is not in 
session and a majority of the Supreme Court consents.
126
  
Delegate Araneta warned that the martial law provision as it stood allowed only 
the President to determine the existence of “lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or 
imminent danger thereof.” In addition to the general Philippine distrust of executive 
power, Delegate Araneta feared that due to the existing judicial precedents in 1934, the 
Supreme Court would be unlikely to review the basis for the President‟s decision to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
127
 With regards to Ferdinand Marcos, it seems 
Araneta was right to fear the executive‟s abuse of this power. After each suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus, beginning in 1905 with Smith, then again in 1953 with 
Quirino, and ending in 1971 with Marcos, the Supreme Court sustained the executive‟s 
decision. In this way, Marcos‟s relationship with the Supreme Court joins an unbroken 
historical precedent in Philippine history. He is not the aberration of the system, but 
merely a progression of the political tradition, pushing it still further to achieve truly 
executive dominated, personalistic rule. 
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THE COMMONWEALTH 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, 
which provided for a ten-year Commonwealth that allowed the U.S. to retain the rights to 
emergency intervention, jurisdiction over foreign and defense affairs, as well as the 
authority to review Supreme Court rulings. Furthermore, the U.S. required that the 
Philippine Constitution be subject to U.S. approval prior to enactment.
128
 The 
Commonwealth was inaugurated on November 15
th
, 1935, after one year and the easy 
acceptance of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, which bore the language and intentions 
of the Jones Law and U.S. Constitution.
129
 Senate President Manuel Luis Quezon was 
elected the first Philippine Commonwealth President and Sergio Osmeña the first Vice-
President. Congressman Locsin discusses President Quezon‟s post-colonial, political 
advantage, recounting,  
Not everybody liked him, but he was the one who was charismatic; he 
looked white, he looked handsome actually. He could carry the fight for 
independence in Washington without looking like an [indio] … These 
things matter. A Spanish man looks like an aristocrat; Americans will 
listen to an aristocrat. In fact, he wasn‟t, I understand he was poor, but he 
looked good. Some of the rich guys around look like natives – that‟s why 
he took the leadership; he knew how to deal with the foreigners.
130
 
 
Remembering the Philippine‟s political tutelage, President Quezon‟s victory is consistent 
with the racist sentiments of the past colonial regimes. Under and as a result of 
colonialism, those of mestizo (mixed white) blood held greater privileges, respect, and 
power. 
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Quezon‟s presidency veritably molded the strong executive office, which Marcos 
later extended to its extreme conclusion. Quezon enjoyed wildly expansive powers, 
which were lifted directly and almost in full from those of the colonial governor-general. 
Yet, Quezon had envisioned a strong executive branch even prior to his election and 
consistently pushed the constitutional convention to create a stronger president than that 
of the White House. While the American president presides over a large federation of 
distinct states, in the Philippines, provincial governments possess only delegated 
authority and power resides in the national branches. This arrangement naturally creates a 
president stronger than its American counterpart.  
The 1935 Philippine Constitution ascribed to Quezon “the authority to disapprove 
individual items in appropriation bills, discretion over the disbursement of budgeted 
funds, and a supervisory control over local government units,” a line item veto that the 
U.S. President does not have.
131
 President Quezon applied his native use of patronage to 
national-level government resources and even leveraged his control over regulation 
agencies as favors and/or threats. Thus, as was true of Marcos as well as other Philippine 
presidents, President Quezon‟s power outstripped even that of the governor-general. 
Additionally, Quezon effectively secured the Nacionalista party‟s dominance in the 
legislature and dealt with provincial politicians to win local vote banks and outmaneuver 
other national politicians. Ultimately, Hutchcroft concludes,  
This strange political system, neither centralized nor decentralized, links 
powerful presidents and powerful local bosses in a relationship that is both 
symbiotic and highly variable … The effect of this system is illustrated in 
the fate of the elected administrations that could not afford to alienate the 
                                                 
131
 Sidel, John T. Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999: 16-17. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09 
 
49 
local clans that controlled political factions (and often private armies) in 
the countryside.
132
  
 
THE „SPECIAL‟ RELATIONSHIP 
A short ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese air force attacked 
the American military base, Clark Air Base, in Pampanga, Philippines, banding 
Americans and Filipinos together to fight side by side. Eventually, in April 1942 after 
less than a year of fighting, the American and Philippine forces surrendered. In 1946, 
after the conclusion of World War II, though delayed by a year, the Philippines finally 
gained its independence. All grievances against the United States were absolved and a 
new tone of gratitude for independence long sought, defense during the war, and a certain 
mix of allegiance, reverence, and fondness shaped Philippine feelings towards the U.S. 
and the future of their “special” relationship. 
John T. Sidel and other students of Philippine history suggest that the Filipinos 
didn‟t shed enough blood; that independence was granted too easily. Sidel argues that as 
a result, “potentially „state-building‟ phases of armed mobilization and military 
consolidation (caudillismo), as occurred in many former colonies during national 
revolutions, were preempted by the American intervention (in 1898-1901 and 1945-
46).”133 Stanley Karnow, the American author who won a Pulitzer Prize for In Our 
Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, notes,  
Filipinos also recoil from tarnishing their nationalist image by too close an 
association with the Americans. They seem to be trapped in a tangle of 
contradictions. History is responsible. Despite their own vague past, the 
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Filipinos might have forged their national personality had they been 
compelled to fight for freedom – as they were indeed doing in their 
conflict against Spain. By acceding to their aspirations for sovereignty so 
soon after conquest, the United States spared them a long struggle for 
independence. But, in a sense, their hopes were fulfilled too easily. 
America‟s acquiescence to their ambitions deflated the élan of their early 
nationalism, leaving them confused and ambivalent. From then on, their 
attitudes toward the United States vacillated between imitation and 
resentment, subservience and defiance, adulation and contempt, love and 
hate.
134
 
 
Ambassador Bosworth reacted to Karnow‟s position, asserting,  
We had no choice, we had to give the Philippines independence, we were 
already late because of the war, we had committed to giving it earlier. 
Americans were never fully comfortable with their colonial position in the 
Philippines or anywhere else; we were a colony and didn‟t like it and the 
feeling was that it was immoral for us to be a colonial power.
135
  
 
This perspective completely ignores the complexities of the situation on the ground. 
Spanish colonialism severely stunted the Philippines‟ growth and when the United States 
swept in, though harsh to declare that, “their hopes were fulfilled too easily,” the 
Filipinos hadn‟t yet completed the lessons that a nation learns from the struggle for self-
rule. The United States had the, admittedly dubious, luxury of coming of age during the 
struggle for independence from Britain, which the Philippines did not. Therefore, when 
the U.S. immediately placed the Philippines on a path to self-rule, without adequate or 
long-term minded political tutelage, it may have been in keeping with her principles, but 
it ignored the nation-building responsibilities she held as a colonial power.  
Similarly, Ambassador Philip Kaplan also agrees with this, Ambassador 
Bosworth‟s, position on the colonial role of the U.S., asking of Karnow:  
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What would he have us do after World War II? After [General] Macarthur 
came back? But Filipinos took over their own destiny and it wasn‟t easy. 
We were there to help. At the time the Philippines was the third or fourth 
largest aid recipient, after Israel and Palestine, which were in a class of 
their own, next was Turkey, and then it was the Philippines.
136
  
 
Ambassador Kaplan is also quick to point out the pro-American sentiment in the 
Philippines, which after World War II, with the exception of the late 1960s and 1970s, 
during the Vietnam War, has been louder and more enduring. Ambassador Kaplan 
recounts,  
I spent all my diplomatic life with allies, I was part of the Cold War effort, 
and I was never in a country that was as pro-American as the Philippines. I 
think he over-stated the basic equation and [it] doesn‟t conform to my 
experience. I‟ve represented the Philippine government from this law firm, 
I‟ve just made my fortieth trip to the Philippines, I‟ve probably visited 
more than any other American, and from a cold eyed perspective I don‟t 
recognize this. It wasn‟t [as such] even with the most nationalist people, 
[with whom] my personal relationships … were always extremely cordial 
… My wife went down to the embassy one day and there were people with 
signs that said „Yankee go home,‟ but underneath it said „and take me with 
you.‟ The relationship with the population as a whole was good. The U.S. 
was seen as a force to assist them in restoring democracy.
137
 
 
Nevertheless, this pro-American sentiment was not a result of American colonialism, 
which embittered many Filipinos towards the U.S. Rather, it took shape only after 
fighting alongside the U.S. in World War II and as a result of the “special relationship” 
between the two countries after the war. 
When presented the same quote, Atty. Romulo easily agreed with Karnow‟s 
statement, as do many Filipino intellectuals and professionals, save for the politicians 
who either do not or may not support the idea that “their hopes were filled too easily.” 
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One such politician, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos‟s right-hand man, reacted quite 
strongly to Karnow‟s statement, arguing,  
I don‟t think the people who loved our country were ashamed to associate 
with the Americans simply because they are Nationalist; I think we are 
enlightened enough [not to] … I don‟t think I can agree with that 
statement. Of course some people didn‟t want to be identified too closely 
with the Americans because at that time there was a growing feeling of 
anti-Americanism in the Philippines, so for political purposes they didn‟t 
want to be called American stooges.
138
  
 
The heart of Senator Enrile‟s political career took place in a much more anti-American 
Philippines, the resentment of which remains with him still today. It is undeniable that the 
Philippines is largely, as Ambassador Kaplan attests, strikingly pro-American. Though 
interrupted by flashes of anti-American fashion, year after year Filipinos dream of 
moving to or visiting the United States and greatly idolize American culture, despite their 
colonial history. This demonstrates that, for the most part, the Philippines has come to 
view the U.S. not as their former colonial ruler, but their ally and mentor. 
Tensions do remain, though they were much stronger in the beginning of the 
Marcos years due to the U.S.‟s Cold War role and the lingering vestiges of colonialism. 
In particular, the latter centered on the military bases and parity rights agreements, which 
incited deep anger in Filipinos. Atty. Romulo also admits, however, that,  
There is that favorite theory that not enough blood was spent insofar as the 
Americans are concerned. I don‟t think [we] can say we truly had a war … 
[or] a real armed resistance against the Americans, though the only reason 
we had to give up was … no one was supplying us with arms from the 
outside to fight this new colonial empire coming in.
139
  
 
The contours of such a special relationship were very much complicated and defined by 
the American colonial political tutelage. Though Mrs. Marcos feels deep respect and 
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kindness towards the U.S., there are still grudges that qualify her friendship. Mrs. Marcos 
complains, “We had no real freedom, we were only free to befriend the friends of 
America.”140  
 
MARCOS‟S PREDECESSOR 
 At the close of World War II and with full grasp of their sovereignty and destiny, 
the Philippines elected Manuel A. Roxas to be president in 1946. President Roxas was an 
ardent American advocate who negotiated the PI-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the 
Military Bases Agreements, however, he died after two years in office.
141
 Vice-President 
Elipidio Quirino finished Roxas‟s term as president and began the struggle against the 
Communist insurgency in the Philippines, fighting the evolved Hukbo ng Bayan Laban 
sa Hapon (“Army of the People Against the Japanese”), which had transformed into the 
Communist Party of the Philippines‟ new military wing.142 The struggle against the 
Communists, like that against the Muslim separatists in the South of the Philippines, 
continues even after Marcos. Marcos‟s political struggles, in this way, only further 
entrench him in what are consistent cycles within Philippine history. 
President Quirino was elected in 1950 and though his term was wild with graft, 
corruption, and electoral fraud, he is most remembered for his decision to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus. President Quirino issued Proclamation 220 on October 22
nd
, 1950, 
in an effort to fight the Huk rebellion. This action came directly after the collapse of a 
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brief truce that the government had negotiated with the Huk leader, Luis M. Taruc.
143
 
President Quirino‟s suspension met widespread criticism and outrage despite the fact that 
the 1935 Philippine Constitution explicitly provided for the suspension as a corollary to 
martial law in Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2. In August of 1952, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Montenegro v. Castañeda, that the suspension was, indeed, constitutional. 
Marcos was, in this way, the last in a line of strong, post-colonial presidents, each of 
whom strengthened the executive branch alongside a weaker, complicit judicial branch.  
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 In Barcelon v. Baker in 1905, the Philippine Supreme Court affirmed the validity 
of the governor-general‟s basis for suspending the writ of habeas corpus and, more 
importantly, established the suspension of that writ as a political question over which the 
Supreme Court does not have judicial review. Montenegro v. Castañeda in 1953 echoed 
the language of Barcelon v. Baker, using the judicial precedent set in 1905 as the basis 
for the decision in favor of President Quirino. In Barcelon v. Baker, the Supreme Court 
ruled that, “The findings of the executive upon which he bases his order suspending the 
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are conclusive and final upon the Courts.”144  
As it would in the subsequent investigations of the colonial period, 
Commonwealth period, and beyond, the Supreme Court “terminated” its investigation, 
bowing to the executive as “the sole and exclusive judge” as to whether a state of 
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“invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof” existed.145 Presidential 
Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of Government Corporate Council under 
Marcos, Hon. Manuel “Lolong” Lazaro, justifies this, explaining,  
[The Supreme Court] cannot inquire into the wisdom. They can rule on the 
legality, but not on the wisdom of his acts … The only one who would 
know the wisdom of what he is doing … is the President … The judiciary 
… can only know [the] facts that are presented to the court; other facts 
[that are] not presented they are not privy to.
146
 
 
 The Philippine courts had been reviewing the validity of the acts of the legislature 
and executive branches of the American colonial period‟s Insular Government long 
before the concept of judicial review first gained expression in organic law.
147
 Anna 
Castañeda, a Philippine legal history scholar, explains,  
When Congress transplanted provisions of the U.S. Constitution to the 
Islands, it also transplanted the interpretation given these provisions by the 
U.S. Supreme Court through its power of judicial review. The broader 
grant of oversight power to the U.S. Supreme Court … facilitated tutelage 
in U.S. jurisprudence.
148
  
 
Formally, it was Article VIII, Sec. 2, Paragraph 1 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution that 
granted the judiciary jurisdiction over “all cases in which the Constitutionality or validity 
of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question.”149 
 Jose A. Angara petitioned in the 1936 case Angara v. Electoral Commission, for 
a writ of prohibition to restrain the Electoral Commission from acting upon the protest 
filed by Pedro Ynusa to bar Angara from taking office in the National Assembly. Though 
the details of the case are not otherwise relevant here, Justice Jose Laurel‟s 1936 decision 
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became the landmark definition of judicial review. Speaking to a separation of powers, 
Laurel wrote, “In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only Constitutional 
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the 
several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.”150 Castañeda 
observes, however, “the bold and confident assumption by the Commonwealth Supreme 
Court of its role as the „final arbiter‟ was in stark contrast to its origins.”151 Castañeda 
explains,  
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was neither so quick nor so 
eager to seize upon the opportunity to exercise its judicial prerogatives, be 
it to strike down legislation that violated individual rights or to play 
gatekeeper to the Executive and Legislative departments of the Insular 
Government. Indeed, early enunciations of the doctrine of judicial review 
display restraint and deference.
152
 
 
Therefore, the later Supreme Court‟s passive deference to the executive and legislature 
had its roots in the American colonial period. The Supreme Court‟s legitimation of and 
submission to Marcos‟s rule, should, therefore, come as no surprise. Supreme Court 
deference to the wisdom of the executive branch appears to be characteristic to the 
historical Philippine political tradition. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE RISE OF FERDINAND MARCOS 
DEMANDS FROM BELOW 
 The second World War severely impacted the Philippines, but with the close of 
the war came genuine self-autonomy for the Philippines. Furthermore, between 
independence in 1946 and Marcos‟s declaration of martial law in 1972, the Philippines‟ 
state and society developed and modernized quite significantly. The national government 
budget of 78 million pesos grew over 800 percent in constant pesos between 1930 and 
1960. The budget more than doubled by 1972 and reached 4.03 billion pesos. The 
number of government employees, which had totaled 29,420 in 1930, also rose 
dramatically due to the strong public demand for government jobs. The new figure 
totaled to over 500,000 government employees in 1972. In fact, while the Philippine 
population had grown roughly 100 percent between 1930 and 1960, the number of 
government employees rose 1100 percent over the same period.
 153
  
Filipinos of the late 1960s and early 1970s were markedly dissimilar to those who 
lived under American colonial rule. Relieved of foreign tutors and constraints, Filipinos 
enjoyed an emancipated politics, grew reliant on a stable constitutional framework, and 
experienced increased political mobilization with the rise of organized interest groups in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Though politics was still firmly elite-dominated, Filipinos had 
become more educated and informed. In 1939, 1 percent of homes had radios and 43 
percent of the population was literate. By 1968 over 60 percent of homes had radios and 
by 1970, 83 percent of the population was literate.
 154
 Accordingly, the more aware and 
articulate populace increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with the elite-run, but 
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purportedly democratic, state. Riding the 1960s‟ global progressive movement, peasants 
in the Philippines advocated for agricultural reform and militant political mobilization 
against their former patrons. Meanwhile, Congressional economic nationalists blocked 
foreign investment.
155
  
With great foresight, Senator Jovito Salonga declared in a speech to the League of 
Women Voters of the Philippines in 1964: 
[D]emocracy is on trial. It will face a greater crisis in the coming years. 
The “revolution of rising expectations” will mount with ever-increasing 
intensity. Popular education, the accelerated tempo and volume of mass 
instruments of communication … the sharpening appeal of mass 
advertisements – all these create wants and needs unknown to our 
forefathers … The problem of massive poverty, of the deterioration of 
morale in public service, the lack of social discipline … the increasing 
incidence of graft, the lack of respect for law and authority, and the 
revolution of rising frustrations … What can be done, what is needed? ... 
We need strong leaders … but they must be leaders devoted to the ideals 
of a free society … strong leaders can easily become brutal, savage 
despots.
156
 
 
Rural and radical urban protest, thus, forced elected officials to hear the demands of the 
people. Therefore, in 1971, Congress finally responded to the calls of the Federation of 
Free Farmers for improvements to the land reform legislation. In a few scattered 
municipalities, additionally, the local elections of 1971 replaced established political 
family leaders with representatives from the new reform groups.
157
 After the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, appealing to the powerless, disadvantaged masses was mandatory for all 
political platforms. 
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THE RISE OF FERDINAND MARCOS  
 Ferdinand Marcos had become the leader of the Liberal Party in the House of 
Representatives by 1957 and he quickly set his eyes on a seat in the Senate. Meanwhile, 
Vice-President Diosdado Macapagal, who courted U.S. government representatives, had 
been secretly feeding political information to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
for years. The agency had vigorously supported Macapagal‟s bid for vice-president.158 
Later, the CIA attempted to form a coalition under a splinter party called the 
Progressives. The coalition paired Vice-President Macapagal with other Liberals who 
were friendly to the CIA, among them Ferdinand Marcos. In 1959 this “Grand Alliance” 
produced a slate of senatorial candidates to oppose those of President Garcia‟s, which 
would pave the road for Macapagal‟s eventual presidency.159 Infighting ultimately 
destroyed the Grand Alliance, and among their conflicts was whether or not Ferdinand 
Marcos should be allowed to run for Senate.  
Seagrave reports that, “nobody trusted him.” He explains, 
Leaders of the Progressive party were afraid of him, convinced he was the 
most dangerous man in the legislature. Among his peers he had a 
reputation for cutthroat tactics that frightened even the corrupt old lions in 
Congress.
160
  
 
It seems that from the beginning, Marcos was the more extreme product of the political 
tradition. Seagrave gives the example of when a Central Bank official refused to 
authorize an import permit for an important Chinese businessman. This led Marcos to 
“burst into his office waving a revolver and pointed the muzzle at his head until the 
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documents were signed and turned over to him.”161 The bank official resigned later that 
day, took his family, and emigrated to the United States.  
There were other victims of Marcos‟s violent threats, but most were too scared to 
complain, choosing simply to emigrate instead. Indeed, there was little recourse for 
political victims, because such coercive and threatening tactics, though more overt with 
Marcos, existed throughout the government. Reports from the late 1950s revealed that the 
families of Marcos‟s victims were at times kidnapped and placed under solitary 
confinement until their husbands conceded to Marcos‟s desires. According to Seagrave, 
however, “these reports were not discussed openly because the victims were afraid to 
complain.”162 There was, thus, natural fear within Congress as to what would happen if 
Marcos were to gain more power, particularly given his confessed intention to become 
president. 
 
VYING FOR PRESIDENT 
Not only did Ferdinand Marcos win election to the Senate, but in April 1963 he 
also became president of the Senate. This particularly powerful position awarded Marcos 
control of the military budget, among other responsibilities. It was during this time that 
Marcos arranged for himself twenty war medals, with a string of affidavits as 
justification.
163
 Moreover, “officers in the armed forces fell over each other to fawn on 
him. Careers were advanced. Ilocano officers rose fast in the army, and the 
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Constabulary.”164 Through favors, patronage, and the creation of national standing, 
Ferdinand Marcos advanced fast along the path to Malacañang Palace. Marcos 
recognized the need to inhabit the system and become part of it, which is why he took the 
pains to build up enough clout, fear, and honor, so as to equal that of the elite leaders he 
competed against. 
Ferdinand Marcos‟s 1965 bid for the presidency took place amid the accelerated 
reformist rallies and demonstrations of Liberal Party President, Diosdado Macapagal‟s, 
third year as president.
165
 At the time, Ferdinand Marcos was the Senate president as well 
as president of the Liberal party, but in a recurring maneuver of Philippine politics, 
Marcos switched to the Nacionalista party – and received no retribution – in order to 
capture the nomination and challenge the incumbent. Amb. Philip Kaplan describes 
Ferdinand Marcos, recounting, “He was a complicated man; he was the smartest Filipino 
I‟ve ever met, not as an intellectual, but he was very agile on his feet … a very good 
politician.”166  
 
NINOY AQUINO 
Ferdinand Marcos and Sen. Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. were the two political 
heavyweights of the time, famed for their formidable intelligence and keen political 
sensibilities. As Stephen CuUnjieng reflects, “[Ferdinand Marcos] was a completely 
different breed, the only rival to him was Ninoy. Ninoy was the only one who could, with 
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cold blooded political skill, still approach Marcos.”167 This matching of giants was the 
running thread throughout the Marcos years. Ninoy Aquino was the symbol of the 
opposition and Marcos‟s only serious and constant threat.  Aquino, thus, became 
Marcos‟s obsession.  
Born in 1932, when Ninoy Aquino ran for mayor of Tarlac he was underage for 
the office. But, he would be 22 by the time he took his oath, so the courts allowed him to 
run. This precise situation recurred when he ran for the Senate. Ferdinand Marcos‟s last 
constitutional term should have ended in 1973 and before ultimately deciding to declare 
martial law, Marcos had considered setting up Imelda Marcos to run for president. 
Senator Ninoy Aquino, however, would be 41 years old and eligible to run, and in no 
way could Mrs. Marcos mount a challenge to Aquino. Expectedly, upon declaring martial 
law in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos immediately jailed Senator Ninoy Aquino. Sitting in jail, 
Aquino would steady himself, assured that because he was 15 years younger than 
Marcos, his time would come and that he need just be patient and wait.
168
 
  
MR. AND MRS. MARCOS 
 In the 1965 presidential campaign, above even his medals, Imelda Romualdez 
Marcos was Ferdinand‟s greatest political asset. Ferdinand Marcos first saw Imelda 
Romualdez in 1955 and married her but eleven days after their first meeting. She was the 
1950s encapsulation of Filipina beauty, but better yet, she was a Romualdez, albeit from 
the less prestigious side. The Romualdez family was a political family from the South, an 
irresistible counterpart to Marcos‟s Northern family. Ferdinand Marcos could hope to 
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draw an intersectional base of support with Imelda and he also stood to gain further 
standing due to the elite Romualdez family name. Mr. and Mrs. Marcos made an 
astoundingly charismatic couple that both instinctively played to and successfully 
captured the hearts of Filipinos. 
 Filipinos famously love entertainment and showmanship – song, dance, and 
romance – they fall in love with the darlings of the silver screen and actors often run for 
office and easily win. Ferdinand Marcos, though portrayed in America as courageous 
and, interestingly, “cute,” was always portrayed in the Philippines as the athletic, 
dynamic man on horseback. Furthermore, Atty. Romulo recalls,  
Imelda … was just the right person for this kind of system … which is a 
little Peronista … She‟s glamorous, she has presence … She knew how to 
manipulate the public. And charming - the woman could sing! So with the 
hell campaigning against someone as dour as Macapagal and as ugly as 
Eva
169
, well [there was] no competition and, again, Marcos was 
charismatic … he had leadership.170  
 
Such statements speak to the inherent hollowness of the Philippine political tradition, 
wherein, as Congressman Locsin intimates from his own experience, “the quality of your 
looks is anywhere from 50-30 million pesos worth of campaigning.”171 However, given 
that politics is merely an elite game, which fails to meaningfully include the larger 
population, one can hardly begrudge the voters such superficiality. 
President Macapagal was of humble origins, which effectively won over the more 
empowered general populace; however, his ineffectual administration was rife with graft 
and corruption. According to Seagrave, however, nobody wanted to run on Ferdinand 
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Marcos‟s ticket. Mrs. Marcos tearfully begged Fernando Lopez,172 who had lost the 
nomination for president, to be her husband‟s vice-president. He finally consented, after 
which Imelda immediately produced a document for Lopez to sign and flashed him a 
huge smile.
173
 Imelda Marcos also formed a group of twenty-five young, wealthy, 
socialite women called the “Blue Ladies.” Their campaign responsibilities were to lavish 
attention on foreign journalists and host Tuesday and Friday political teas.
174
  
Much of the public assumed that, after giving up on Vice-President Emmanuel 
Pelaez‟s presidential candidacy, the CIA was working to support Marcos. Ferdinand 
Marcos had been friendly to the CIA since his early days as a Congressman.
175
 The 
intelligence organization seemed to be bolstering his reception abroad, as they had done 
for Diosdado Macapagal and Ramon Magsaysay, who was President from 1953-1957. 
Indeed, warm and excessive foreign media coverage of Philippine politics was often an 
indicator of CIA involvement.
176
 Seagrave notes, “In cover stories and feature articles 
[Marcos] was portrayed as an authentic war hero, recipient of the U.S. Medal of Honor, 
and one whom America could depend upon to preserve democracy with his very life. The 
articles were almost without exception uncritical.”177 In the end, Marcos and Lopez 
defeated Macapagal in the 1965 election by 670,000 votes.
178
 Ferdinand had campaigned 
furiously with Mrs. Marcos and they formed a vigorous, youthful pairing: the political 
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star and an innocent, provincial beauty queen. Marcos‟s anti-corruption stance also won 
over the Philippine electorate as did his slogan “This nation can be great again.”179  
 
THE FIRST TERM 
As President, Ferdinand Marcos empowered the civilian bureaucracy and 
military. He placed them under his direct authority and increased their resources, which 
he then made readily available to himself.
180
 Congressman Locsin provides an analysis as 
to how Marcos built up his military power. He relates that Marcos‟s strategy was to 
recruit officers from his home province to ensure top-level loyalty, but fill his infantry 
with the more experienced fighters, accustomed to fighting terrorist or separatist Muslims 
in the South of the Philippines. Locsin explains, 
He concentrated on Iloilo, injecting the Ilocanos
181
 into the officer class. 
That‟s something that‟s easy to do because Ilocanos are basically 
hardworking and poor and there‟s the [physical] proximity to the 
Philippine Military Academy. The southerners are actually, so I‟m told, 
better fighters in the field … they [a]re always in conflict with Muslims. 
But, Marcos knew what to do: get your southern soldiers, infantry, but the 
officers are all from the north and they‟re the ones who command the 
divisions. He set that military stage. And then, the communists really 
helped.
182
 
 
Congressman Locsin thus draws attention to the fact that not only does power flow from 
wealth, but it also accompanies a monopoly of violence and protection, especially during 
times of crisis. Being a military man, Ferdinand Marcos never underestimated this second 
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component, for even if power did not directly flow from it, military support could at the 
least defend his power. 
President Fidel V. Ramos reflected on Ferdinand Marcos‟s early presidency and 
notes,  
During [Marcos‟s] first term, if you will recall, he [conducted] the miracle 
rise … He did the infrastructure program, connecting the Philippines as 
much as possible and putting the Philippines on a proper economic path.
183
  
 
Marcos dedicated his first term to his infrastructure program, the legacy of which still 
remains today. The pro-Marcos camp often cite this as an example of the direction and 
progress that Marcos ushered in, while the anti-Marcos camp respectfully acknowledges 
the impact that the infrastructure had in the Philippines. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile lauds 
Marcos‟s program achievements, noting,  
Everything that we see today: roads, irrigation systems, even the rural 
electrification of the country, including the introduction of failed nuclear 
power system – failed [due to] the succeeding administration, not … 
Marcos – and all the modernization that you see here, the starting point of 
the modernization of our metropolis, the highways that you are seeing 
now, were products of the Marcos regime.
184
 
 
The literature also uniformly marvels at what Atty. Romulo describes to be 
Ferdinand Marcos‟s knack for “putting the right people in the right places.” These were 
the so-called technocrats of the Marcos years, the exemplar of which was Cesar Virata, 
the Finance Minister under President Marcos.
185
 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, a 
Supreme Court Justice under President Corazon Aquino, confirms, “I‟ve mentioned … 
several times about Marcos‟s ability to choose administrators of some level of honesty 
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and pretty good level of confidence, the archetypal example of this is Cesar Virata, 
Vicente Paterno … Gerardo Sikat.”186 For his part, Cesar Virata explains, 
Marcos selected a very good Cabinet … [Y]ou ask many people and [they 
agree] he really had a very good cabinet. His main instruction to us [was]: 
do your best in your own field, you let me know what you think is the best 
decision, and let me think about the political consequences of your 
decision, because we were not politicians … So, in a way he [was] really 
intellectually bright [in] that he can respond to you and give you 
[recommendations] that will make [decisions] more palatable politically, 
but [while still having] the same effect.
187
 
 
Despite the many improvements, however, Marcos‟s administration suffered from the 
chronic ills of runaway inflation, unemployment, and corruption, and gave rise to 
unprecedented vocal popular dissent.
188
  
The midterm election of 1967 greatly strengthened the Nacionalista party 
presence in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. In 1967, however, the 
Liberal Party senator, Ninoy Aquino, also won office.
189
 In a 1968 article in Foreign 
Affairs, Aquino wrote about the Philippines as a land of “traumatic contrasts,” charging,  
Here is a land where freedom and its blessings are a reality for a minority 
and an illusion for the many. Here is a land consecrated to democracy but 
run by an entrenched plutocracy. Here, too, are a people whose ambitions 
run high, but whose fulfillment is low and mainly restricted to the self- 
perpetuating elite. Here is a land of privilege and rank – a republic 
dedicated to equality but mired in an archaic system of caste.
190
  
 
Like Marcos, Senator Aquino recognized the need to champion the interests of the 
masses, if not in earnest at least in rhetoric. Despite the lack of drastic improvement to 
these basic societal flaws, which Marcos had campaigned to fix, he won reelection in 
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1969 in an infamous campaign, steeped in electoral fraud and terrorism.
191
 Not long after 
beginning his first term, Marcos had already toyed with the idea of amending the official 
two term presidential limit set in the 1935 Constitution. Such early plotting should be 
taken in light of the fact that, at this point, no incumbent president had ever even won 
reelection.
192
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CHAPTER SIX: CRISIS MODE  
1969 AND THE SECOND TERM 
Despite the economic crisis that ravaged the Philippines from 1967 to 1968, in 
1969, President Marcos ran the most expensive election campaign in Philippine history 
and used government funds to do so. He would take no chances on the 1969 election, 
which was a contest of personality, coercion, and patronage, with fraud, intimidation, 
violence, stolen ballot boxes, and pork barrel distributed to officials at the village level. 
Luckily for Marcos, the opposition was unable to produce a competitive candidate to 
oppose him; Senator Aquino was still too young. The Liberal party nominated the 
Cebuano Senator Sergio Osmeña Jr., the son of the former President Osmeña, alongside 
the brother of the former President Magsaysay, who was Osmeña‟s vice-president. 
President Marcos even went so far as to set aside departmental budgetary funds to 
support friendly politicians‟ congressional campaigns and to fund his own patronage 
distributions.
193
  
Marcos portrayed himself as a nationalist and campaigned on the platform of 
greater independence from the United States, promising a renegotiation of the U.S. 
military air bases and accusing Osmeña of collaboration with the Japanese. 
Unfortunately, Marcos‟s exorbitant campaign spending plunged the Philippine economy 
further into crisis. He left the national treasury struggling to pay a daunting foreign debt 
and wild trade deficit, having bled it dry of all foreign exchange reserves.
194
 By 1970, the 
demonstrations, rallies, walkouts, sit-ins, teach-ins, and the like, reached a new 
calamitous height. Demanding societal reform, the protesters denounced the United 
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States,
195
 President Marcos, “fascism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism,” and 
created a veritable “parliament of the streets.”196  
 
UPRISINGS AND DEMOCRACY AS REVOLUTION 
 Fierce reaction to the 1969 election accompanied the other general calls for 
reform. The 1969 and early 1970 student protests, especially the “Battle of Mendiola” on 
January 30
th
, 1970 when hordes of students attempted to march on Malacañang Palace, 
brought about the eventual attempt for constitutional reform that would occur in 
November, 1970.
197
 Marcos was also able to manipulate the restless revolutionary 
atmosphere to his own ends. After their dissolution, following the Huk rebellion that led 
President Quirino to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in 1950, the Communist Party re-
established itself in December of 1968. Subsequently, their military arm, The New 
People‟s Army (NPA), emerged just a few months later on March 29th, 1969. They 
mobilized out of their shared belief with Mao Zedong that “political power grows out of 
the barrel of a gun.”198 Ultimately, this provided Marcos with the same justification for 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus that President Quirino gave 21 years before. First, 
however, in a brilliant political tactic, Marcos began by excoriating the oligarchs and 
blaming them for the Philippine‟s problems to defuse the radical militarism and social 
criticism mounted against him. 
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 Isabelo T. Crisostomo, a strong Marcos supporter in 1973, reflects on the effect 
that public demonstrations had on President Marcos. Crisostomo charts Marcos‟s 
evolution into a “revolutionary,” which ultimately led him to declare martial law and 
champion his “New Society” program. Crisostomo pinpoints the public uprising as the 
starting point for Marcos, who had said that demonstrations “strengthen the hand of any 
man who wants to reform government.”199 Crisostomo writes, 
Marcos himself knew democracy in the Philippines had not been as 
successful as it should be. It had been a failure because it had not been 
flexible enough to allow the great majority of the people to share and 
enjoy the privilege and power monopolized by a well-entrenched 
oligarchy … He must offer the people a better alternative to lure them 
away from the Communists. That alternative was democracy itself, but 
democracy transformed.
200
 
 
On January 25
th, 1971, therefore, Marcos launched the “Democratic Revolution,” which 
Crisostomo hails as “a revolution unique in history because it was to be constitutional, 
legal and within the framework of democracy.”201 
 Surveying the thousands of Filipinos gathered outside Congress that day, 
desperate for change, Marcos said, “They demand a revolution in the tradition of our 
democracy. They fight a democratic revolution.”202 Crisostomo adeptly perceives that, 
“By thus identifying the revolution as democratic, Marcos succeeded, in one master 
stroke, in isolating the Communists from the rest of the revolutionaries, the great majority 
of whom were not ideologues.”203 Then to the joint session of Congress, President 
Marcos announced, 
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I come to speak of a society that is sick, so sick that it must either be cured 
now or buried in a deluge of reforms … For survival is no longer enough 
for our people … When the „economic royalists‟ prove to be insatiable, 
when they use the combination of media and economic power to coerce 
and intimidate the duly elected leaders of the people and to advance their 
privileges and financial gains, there is no course left but to eradicate 
them.
204
 
 
From there, President Marcos, Crisostomo summarizes,  
 
[P]rescribed an immediate reexamination of the postulates of Philippine 
society: the ownership of land, the place of the worker in industry in terms 
of security and dignity, the re-creation of an exploitative society into a 
cooperative one, and the broadening of the nation‟s horizons in the world 
community.
205
 
 
Such revolutionary talk fell in line with the demands of the people, but the 
specific targeting of Marcos‟s criticism proved such overtones to be insincere. In 
particular, the Lopez family bore the brunt of Marcos‟s criticism, due to the scathing and 
courageous anti-Marcos editorials they printed in the Manila Chronicle. Even before the 
“Democratic Revolution,” Vice-President Fernando Lopez resigned as secretary of 
agriculture on January 14
th
, 1971.
206
  
Marcos had long envied the wealth and prestige of the Lopez family and had eyed 
their Manila Electric Company (Meralco). He therefore investigated Meralco as well as 
the other Lopez family holdings. After declaring martial law in 1972, the government 
took over the Lopez enterprise, but not all of the entrenched oligarchy suffered under 
Marcos. In keeping with the nature of past Philippine politics, Marcos could not afford to 
alienate all of the business elite. So, he chose his victims carefully and destroyed only 
those families he perceived to be a threat to him.  
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THE CONCON 
The Philippines turned to the November 1970 constitutional convention (the 
“ConCon”) to correct electoral evils, social injustice, heavy consolidation of power under 
Marcos, and the influence of partisan politics in all government decisions.
207
 The 
delegates contemplated switching to the parliamentary system as the remedy. Given the 
nearing end of his second term, Marcos saw this as an opportunity to constitutionally 
prolong his stay in power. Indeed, later generations of frustrated Filipinos and power 
hungry Presidents
208
 have again considered this solution to repair the political system and 
retain power, respectively, though to no avail. In 1970 there was also the deeper, general 
feeling that the time had come to replace the colonial 1935 Constitution. According to the 
ConCon‟s secretary-general, Jose Abueva, there were varied efforts by politicians to stall 
and end the idea of a constitutional convention. He credited student activist pressure for 
the fact that it was convened at all.
209
 With regards to electoral reform, the revision of the 
laws increased the secrecy of the ballot, which was a welcome and needed change. 
Making it more difficult for politicians to track how their supporters voted, however, 
merely encouraged politicians to resort to more violent coercion and to paying off 
potential opposition voters.
210
  
The election of ConCon delegates was one of the most peaceful and fair elections 
in Philippine history and succeeded in stirring a striking amount of debate on the 
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issues.
211
 The majority of the delegates favored retaining a presidential system, wished to 
strengthen local governments, and opposed allowing either Ferdinand or Imelda Marcos 
to continue in office past the convention.
212
 The “ban the Marcoses” resolution stipulated 
that no president, former president, nor any of their close relatives be eligible for 
executive office under the new constitution. According to the 1935 Constitution, 
President Marcos‟s final term had to end in 1973. Prior to the convention, Marcos had 
already frequently stated that Mrs. Marcos may one day have to run in order “to save the 
country from communism.”213 Unless, of course, the ConCon decided to switch to a 
parliamentary system, which President Marcos supported, and under which he hoped to 
become prime minister. 
Despite the outward appearance that Marcos had no friends within the ConCon, 
he was able to exert considerable influence over the internal deliberations. Wurfel 
reports,  
According to a young attorney at Malacañang who later defected, 
presidential staffers in 1971 had been assigned to identify the „needs‟ of 
delegates and then to provide them with governmental loans, civil service 
appointments for friends and relatives, special clearance through customs, 
and so forth.
214
  
 
By 1972, the Marcoses adopted more direct tactics and even handed out envelopes of 
cash to pliable delegates. Eduardo Quintero, an elder delegate, was so appalled by this 
behavior that he exposed President Marcos‟s underhanded dealings on the convention 
floor. The press and public were infuriated and demanded the expulsion of the delegates 
that Quintero had named. When this didn‟t happen, public respect for the ConCon all but 
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vanished.
215
 As the ConCon deliberations dragged on, President Marcos was losing time 
if he was going to prolong his stay in power. 
 
PLAZA MIRANDA- THE LAST STRAW 
 During the middle of the Constitutional Convention, on August 21
st
, 1971, Plaza 
Miranda was bombed. The plaza was a symbol of free expression, located in Quiapo 
district and contained by the Shrine of Jesus Christ, the Black Nazarene, and the Quiapo 
Church, which flanked the plaza. It was a busy downtown square and the site of frequent 
demonstrations and protests.
216
 The Liberal Party was holding a rally for the midterm 
election, featuring eight senatorial candidates, when two grenades suddenly appeared on 
stage, killing eleven people and injuring ninety more. The prominent Liberal Party 
senators weren‟t spared and even Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and Gerardo Roxas 
were severely injured. President Marcos‟s reaction was strong and swift. He denounced 
the crime and immediately suspended the writ of habeas corpus. He ordered high profile 
arrests, such as those of nationalist group leaders like Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the 
president of the Philippine College of Commerce, and four members of Kabataang 
Makabayan (Nationalist Youth), as well as 100 subsequent arrests of people allegedly 
involved in a Communist terrorist bomb plot.
217
  
Senator Jose Diokno, a leading Nacionalista Party member, promptly resigned 
following the Plaza Miranda bombing. He claimed that, “military men trained by the 
military threw grenades, not Communists as charged by Marcos” and that “fragments of 
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grenades found at the plaza indicate that it came from army armory.”218 This was not a 
surprising accusation. At first many believed that it had in fact been President Marcos‟s 
hand behind the plot, but no concrete claims were ever substantiated against him. As 
Stephen CuUnjieng explains, “it seems the Communists really were the likely culprits, 
but the blame placed upon Marcos demonstrates his unpopularity in 1971, a fact which 
many forget by 1972 when martial law was declared and welcomed.”219  
Marcos‟s actions did warrant suspicion, however. He very quickly seized the 
bombing as an opportunity to turn the situation on Senator Ninoy Aquino. Ferdinand 
Marcos accused Aquino of aiding the Communist threat by supplying weapons and 
ammunition. President Marcos also claimed that Aquino himself was a Communist. 
Selflessly, Marcos vowed that he would do all he could to block Aquino from ascending 
to the presidency, even if it meant offering Mrs. Marcos as a candidate.  
Various events, however, which combined to paint the scene of lawless violence 
and radical uprising that President Marcos desired, were in fact staged. As early as the 
end of his first term, Marcos provoked political violence to secure his re-election.
220
 
Congressman Locsin reveals, 
Mrs. Marcos had a list of Leftist leaders on her payroll … she actually had 
them on a payroll and they would take part in demonstrations and Marcos 
would say the Communists were about to take over. I must say though, 
that was later … [T]hey got a grip on the Leftist demonstrations [which 
were genuine] and turned it around and used it for their purposes again. 
That‟s true, because I was a witness to that, [Mrs. Marcos] had many of 
them on the payroll.
221
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Much like Marcos took the advantage in painting the Communists as being on the side of 
disorder, and his “democratic revolution” on the side of radical reform in addition to 
order, he fomented the explosive climate to his own ends. When Senator Juan Ponce 
Enrile was attacked on September 22
nd, 1972, Marcos boldly called it the “last straw,” 
leading him declare martial law. In keeping with Congressman Locsin‟s claims, Enrile 
would later admit that the ambush had, in fact, been staged.  
 
LANSANG V. GARCIA 
 Lansang v. Garcia tried the validity of President Marcos‟s suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus. The case was the nail in the coffin for democracy under Marcos. 
Certainly, due to President Marcos‟s legal background, he was very careful to proceed 
only with full legal support. Later, when he declared martial law, critics maintained that 
the Supreme Court and lower courts were open and that Congress and the Constitutional 
Convention were both in session.
222
 The Lansang v. Garcia case, however, which took 
place nine months prior to President Marcos‟s declaration of martial law, had already 
decided the constitutionality of the declaration.
223
  
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld President Marcos‟s 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, stating “We entertain … no doubt about the 
existence of a group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the 
government and have been and are still engaged in rebellion against the government of 
the Philippines.”224 The Lansang v Garcia case thus “abandoned the doctrine of non-
inquiry into the factual basis for the President‟s suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
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habeas corpus, a doctrine which the Court used in previous cases and which was justified 
on the basis of separation of powers.”225 This would seem to set a precedent for increased 
judicial activism, however, in practice, deciding upon political questions only placed the 
judiciary in the role of legitimizing Marcos‟s regime, for they were consistently unable to 
stand up to the executive branch. 
Not only failing to challenge the President‟s judgment, now the Supreme Court 
also rubber stamped Marcos‟s actions. The decision had profound implications as it 
removed any obstacle to the President‟s declaration of martial law. With regards to the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Stephen CuUnjieng notes,  
Marcos tested to see if people would complain and when only the 
intellectuals and students did, not the masses, and the Supreme Court 
upheld its validity saying that it was the power of Marcos to suspend [the 
writ], guess what happens, the next year he says “the same provision that 
suspends the writ of habeas corpus also allows me to declare martial 
law.”226  
 
Indeed, Marcos would repeatedly invoke the Lansang v. Garcia case in his September 23, 
1972 speech, in order to assert the constitutionality of his declaration of martial law. This 
fact only supports Mr. CuUnjieng‟s assertion that Marcos‟s actions were discrete pieces 
of a gradual, evolving strategy to remain in power. Atty. Romulo also supports this 
analysis, discussing Lansang v. Garcia and noting, 
[E]veryone feels that, that opened the door to Martial Law ultimately, 
because the Supreme Court believed … that the NPA [was] really a clear 
and present danger to the republic, so they allowed the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, so with that, that‟s only one step away from martial 
law. When you say that there‟s an imminent danger, our constitution … 
[dictated that] you could then declare Martial Law … Marcos … very 
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smartly, knew that he couldn‟t declare Martial Law off-hand, so he laid 
the basis [first].
227
 
 
Marcos only took this final step after September 22
nd
, 1972, when the Secretary of 
Defense, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, was ambushed. Marcos‟s handwritten diary entry 
from that night reads:  
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed near Wack-Wack at about 8 
p.m. tonight. It was a good thing he was riding in his security car as a 
protective measure. His first car, which he usually uses, was the one 
riddled by bullets from a car parked in ambush. He is now at his DND 
office and I have advised him to stay there. And I have doubled the 
security of Imelda [Marcos] in Nayong Pilipino where she is giving dinner 
to the UPI and AP as well as other wire services. This makes the martial 
law proclamation a necessity.
228
 
 
Marcos‟s diary should not be taken at face value, for his admitted concern over how 
history would judge him is what compelled him to write it at all. Despite Marcos‟s 
feigned shock and worry, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile admitted at a press conference with 
Fidel Ramos in February 1986 that the ambush was staged.
229
 The Philippine Inquirer 
further reports that “[Enrile] and Ramos were part of the „Rolex 12,‟ the group of military 
advisers who had helped Marcos plan martial law.”230 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HERE TO STAY 
DECLARING MARTIAL LAW 
 Proclamation No. 1081 proclaimed the state of martial law. In it, Marcos listed the 
NPA‟s advancements and activities as an effort to “wage a full scale armed insurrection 
and rebellion in this country … vigorously pursuing a relentless and ruthless armed 
struggle against our duly constituted government.”231 Note the use of the word 
“insurrection,” which appears ten times throughout the document and connects the 
country‟s situation to the one precisely described by the language of Article VII, Section 
10, Paragraph 2 of the 1935 Constitution.
232
 In addition, the term “lawless violence” 
appears three times in Proclamation No. 1081, while “rebellion” appears thirteen times. 
This is of course natural, for it is necessary to justify one‟s basis for declaring martial law 
in legal and constitutional terms.  
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who was the architect of martial law, verifies that 
President Marcos had indeed been planning martial law for quite some time. There had 
been the frequent references to the possibility that Mrs. Marcos would “have to run” in 
order to save the country from Communism, Ninoy Aquino, and other “dangers.” These, 
in addition to the early investigations into martial law and its relevant judicial precedents, 
as well as Marcos‟s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which occurred just before 
his constitutional elected term should have ended, point towards a premeditated strategy 
designed to prolong his stay in power. 
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 When asked how early into 1971, when the Plaza Miranda bombing occurred, or 
1972, the promulgation of Proclamation No. 1081, Ferdinand Marcos had first begun 
thinking about martial law, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile replied, “We started studying 
Martial Law December of 1969.”233 December 1969 was just one month after Marcos‟s 
second term began, a full year before the ConCon of November 1970, and a year and a 
half prior to his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Senator Enrile describes the 
preparation for martial law, recounting: 
We prepared a well-argued, well-written compendium of cases and articles 
bearing on the subject. And he asked me to prepare all the documents 
without any model and I did it.  And I finished the preparation in the third 
quarter of 1970. I gathered all the facts, the incidents about the current 
rebellion at the time, the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the 
condition of law and order in the country, and I put them together and 
wrote out the proclamation.  And the seven General Orders, seven Letters 
of Instruction, including the first document, [which] was prepared not by 
me, but by the Palace.
234
 
 
Senator Enrile further intimates that in his preparation, he relied upon the 1905 Barcelon 
v. Baker case sustaining Governor-General James F. Smith‟s suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus.
235
 Governor-General Smith‟s suspension was the Philippines‟ first 
experience with the kind of authoritative executive action that President Quirino would 
later take and that Ferdinand Marcos would eventually bring to its extreme conclusion. 
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JUSTIFICATION 
 President Marcos outlined in clear and persuasive terms the state of danger that 
existed, the necessity for martial law, and the legality of his actions. Proclamation No. 
1081 of September 21
st
, 1972 begins by describing the NPA, 
[W]hose daring and wanton guerrilla activities have generated and sown 
fear and panic among our people; have created a climate of chaos and 
disorder, produced a state of political, social, psychological and economic 
instability in our land, and have inflicted great suffering and irreparable 
injury to persons and property in our society…236 
 
Cleverly, Marcos then calls upon the people‟s allegiance to government, constitution, and 
rule of law, which not only paints his actions as necessary, but also non-radical and 
logical. His language divides the country into opposing sides, wherein the country has 
been victimized and Marcos‟s administration lies on the side of order, law, and history. 
Proclamation No. 1081 declares, 
Whereas, these lawless elements, their cadres, fellow travelers, friends, 
sympathizers and supporters have for many years up to the present time 
been mounting sustained, massive and destructive propaganda assaults 
against our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies 
and officials, and also against our social, political, economic and religious 
institutions, through the publications, broadcasts and disseminations of 
deliberate slanted and overly exaggerated news stories and news 
commentaries as well as false, vile[,] foul and scurrilous statements, 
utterances, writings and pictures…237  
 
Proclamation No. 1081 continues, describing the NPA‟s actions as: 
 
[C]learly well-conceived, intended and calculated to malign and discredit 
our duly constituted government, its instrumentalities, agencies, and 
officials, before our people, making it appear to the people that our 
government has become so weak and so impotent…238 
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Heard by all, these pronouncements and their tone masterfully stir a desire for the 
government to retaliate swiftly, decisively, and forcefully. Such action, backed by the 
constant reminders of its constitutional provision and the judicial precedents of Philippine 
history, is what President Marcos promised to deliver.  
 Proclamation No. 1081 makes explicit the legality and logic to martial law, given 
the Lansang v. Garcia decision. The Proclamation outlines, 
Whereas, the Supreme Court in the cases brought before it, docketed as 
G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-
34039, L-34265, and L-34339, as a consequence of the suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by me as President of the 
Philippines in my Proclamation No.889, dated August 21, 1971, as 
amended, has found that in truth and in fact there exists an actual 
insurrection and rebellion in the country by a sizeable group of men who 
have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government…239 
 
The document then goes on to quote at length from the Supreme Court‟s Lansang v. 
Garcia decision. The quotes take pains to reiterate history and the judiciary‟s recognition 
of the existence of “communist activities in the Philippines … from the late twenties to 
early thirties … aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion.”  
The included Lansang v. Garcia excerpts continue to describe how these 
insurgent activities waned, but resurfaced in the late forties “with such vigor as to be able 
to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army … which clashed several times with 
the armed forces.” The decision then states that those events caused “President Quirino to 
issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castañeda.”240 
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The Supreme Court decision also substantiates the danger that the Communist 
army has historically posed, citing the June 20
th
, 1957 Republic Act No. 1700, also 
known as the Anti-Subversion Act. The decision specifically quotes the preamble to the 
Anti-Subversion Act, which states: 
[T]he Communist Party of the Philippines, although a purportedly 
apolitical party, is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and 
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the 
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to 
alien domination and control … the continued existence and activities of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present and 
grave danger to the security of the Philippines; and … in the fact of the 
organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but 
international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to 
cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the 
country ... 
241
 
 
The Supreme Court continues to list the Communist party‟s 1963 mobilization and 1969 
reorganization into the New People‟s Army, which adheres to the Maoist concept of the 
“War of National Liberation.”242 Lastly, Proclamation No. 1081 then includes in full, the 
NPA‟s “Regional Program of Action 1972,” a copy of which the 116th and 119th 
Philippine Constabulary Companies captured on June 18
th
, 1972. This Program of Action 
delineates alarmingly and in great detail, the NPA‟s goals and plans.  
Despite the existence and gravity of a real Communist threat, however, it was 
ultimately Lansang v. Garcia that opened the doors to martial law. The Supreme Court‟s 
1971 decision both verified the Communist threat and sustained President Marcos‟s 
invocation of Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2. For, Article VII provides for the 
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suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, then in the same breath, a corollary provision for 
the declaration of martial law.  
 
A COURSE OF ACTION 
Proclamation No. 1081 concludes with an evaluation of the courses of action open 
to the president. The document reads that first, President Marcos could “call out the 
armed forces to suppress the present lawless violence,” second, “suspend the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus to make arrest and apprehension of these lawless elements 
easier and more effective,” or third, “place the Philippines or any part thereof under 
martial law.”243 From there, President Marcos reminds the public that he had already 
committed almost fifty per cent of the entire armed forces as well as created specific task 
forces to combat the insurgency, in addition to suspending the writ of habeas corpus.
244
  
“But in spite of all that,” Marcos continued, “both courses of action were found 
inadequate and ineffective to contain, much less solve, the present rebellion and the 
lawlessness in the country.”245 Marcos then went on to once again prove the existence 
and gravity of the Communist threat. After which, Proclamation No. 1081 concluded 
with the President‟s final declaration: 
Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by 
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 
(2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my 
capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed 
forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the 
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as 
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws 
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and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon 
my direction. In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently 
detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for 
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses 
committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or 
in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of 
nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of 
authority, rank, title and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, 
crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be 
enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as 
crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or 
regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my 
direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by 
me or by my duly designated representative.
246
 
 
In President Marcos‟s nationwide radio and television broadcast proclaiming 
martial law, he began with the assurance that his aims were democratic: 
The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly 
elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by the 
military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our 
democracy.
247
 
 
Marcos then rallied for the nation‟s support in favor of his democracy over Communism, 
and for cooperation in his decision to impose martial law. Marcos declared, 
A republican and democratic form of government is not a helpless 
government. When it is imperiled by the danger of a violent overthrow, 
insurrection and rebellion, it has inherent and built-in powers wisely 
provided for under the Constitution. Such a danger confronts the 
Republic.
248
 
 
President Marcos then enumerated the new orders and rules of conduct under 
martial law. These first orders were that, first, “all public officials and employees whether 
of the national or local governments must conduct themselves in the manner of a new and 
reformed society.” Second, government would “control media and other means of 
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dissemination of information as well as all public utilities” for the “meantime.” 
Furthermore, all schools would be closed for a week, the “carrying of firearms outside 
residences without permission of the armed forces” would be punishable by death, a 
curfew would be in place from midnight to four in the morning, “departure of Filipinos 
abroad” would be temporarily suspended,249 and lastly, rallies, demonstrations, and 
“strikes in critical public utilities” would be temporarily prohibited.250 President Marcos 
explained, “It is my intention beginning tomorrow to issue all the orders which would 
attain reforms in our society.”251 
 
A NEW REGIME FOR A NEW SOCIETY 
 President Marcos made his broadcast at 7:15 PM on September 23
rd
, 1972. The 
few who processed Marcos‟s opening words – “As of the 21st of September, I signed 
Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law. This proclamation 
was to be implemented upon my clearance, and clearance was granted at 9:00 in the 
evening of the 22
nd
 of September.” – would have realized that there was a delay between 
the time that the declaration went into effect and when it was publicly broadcasted.
252
 
Marcos had purposefully done so in order to time his arrests. Journalist Amando Doronila 
of The Philippine Inquirer, who had been Editor-in-Chief of The Manila Chronicle in 
1972 until martial law interrupted business, writes, “Arrest orders of targets, including 
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opposition figures and newspapermen, were served beginning at midnight of Sept. 22, 
Friday, straddling Sept. 23.”253  
The last headline article for The Manila Chronicle reported Sen. Benigno Aquino, 
Jr. accusing President Marcos of “preparing the ground for an administration plot to 
liquidate [him],” which Marcos would then conveniently blame on the Communists.254 
Doronila recounts, “Troops descended on all newspapers, padlocked them and nailed the 
proclamation dated Sept. 21. Marcos trumped Aquino and shocked the country with 
superb use of the element of surprise by manipulating the dates of the proclamation.”255 
This manipulation was unprecedented, but unfortunately, not explicitly illegal. 
On September 23
rd
, Ferdinand Marcos wrote in his diary at 12:20 noon:  
Things have moved according to plans although out of the total 200 target 
personalities in the plan only 53 have been arrested, including the three 
senators, Aquino, Jose Diokno and Ramon Mitra and Chino Roces 
[publisher of The Manila Times] and Teddy [Teodoro Locsin Sr.], editor 
of the Philippines Free Press. Roces, Locsin, Max Soliven of The Manila 
Times, Napoleon Rama of the Free Press and Luis Mauricio of the 
Graphic were among the first to be arrested at midnight at their homes in 
the first round of arrests…I was surprised to hear [Executive] Secretary 
[Alex] Melchor say he was now in favor of martial law although he was 
against it a year and a half ago. And all [Justice] Secretary Jose Abad 
Santos said was, „Let us not talk about it publicly.‟256 
 
Given the immediate arrest of his father Teodoro Locsin Sr., and the destruction of their 
family newspaper, Congressman Teodoro Locsin Jr. remains deeply impacted by the 
declaration of martial law. Congressman Locsin recounts the reaction of another of his 
relatives, Roberto “Bobby” Benedicto, who “was [a] notorious … crook … one of the 
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worst [Marcos] cronies.”257 Locsin reports that Bobby Benedicto used to tell him that 
when Marcos declared martial law, “he cried … [Benedicto] was so scared … it wouldn‟t 
work.”258 Congressman Locsin explains that the fear stemmed from the fact that the 
Philippine tradition wasn‟t one of heavy-handed, executive directed action, such as 
military rule, and that it simply wasn‟t anything the people “could conceive of.” Locsin 
recalls, 
[Benedicto] thought he was going to die, that the army would not obey, 
that they‟d turn around and kill him instead. So the reason Benedicto 
became close to the others is [that] they actually held him in his arms and 
comforted him in that seventy-two hour period … It took us all by 
surprise. And we believed all that rhetoric: we the people don‟t want this; 
we the people don‟t want that. Well “we the people” weren‟t us 
[Filipinos], we just don‟t do anything, and that was it, and that‟s all. I 
mean, that … [previous] political class lasted from before Independence to 
the eve of September ‟72, and it vanished overnight. It was just gone. I 
don‟t know what that says. [Then] Marcos just installed his own class.259 
 
Despite the natural surprise, as Congressman Locsin points out, there was no 
widespread anger or retaliation, no demands for a restitution of citizens‟ rights. For, along 
with these arrests, Marcos immediately adjourned the National Congress, shut down most 
of the mass media, suspended civil liberties, and banned all political parties.
260
 As 
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile notes, though, “there was a reason for [martial law],” which 
explains the initial lack of protest. He elaborates, 
It was the height of the Vietnam War, it was … the feeling at the time was 
that the wave of communist victories around the world was such that the 
next target of communism was the Philippines and the New People‟s 
Army was building its forces and in fact, they succeeded in importing into 
the country about 1,500 M14s plus rocket-propelled grenades, the, what 
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they call, RPG 40, which they used in Vietnam extensively.  And we 
captured this shipment in Isabela.
261
 
 
Martial law far outlasted its original purpose, however, lifted only in 1981 long after the 
Communists had been beaten back. In a New York Times interview on June 17
th
, 1974, 
President Marcos admitted that he had “largely „neutralized‟ the „public disorder and 
rebellion‟ that led him to impose martial law … nearly two years ago,” in 1972.262 He 
went on to explain, however, that, “he had not been able to complete the social and 
economic reforms that he said were necessary to prevent recurrence of the so-called 
rebellion.”263 Ferdinand Marcos himself would not be removed from power until the 
People‟s Power Revolution of 1986. For that whole time, Marcos would seek to, as 
Rolando V. del Carmen describes, “portray to observers at home and abroad … despite 
the realities of martial law, [that] constitutional procedures have not been abrogated and 
that the judiciary [was] alive and well.”264 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME 
PUBLIC REACTIONS  
In 1972, the people were very scared of what was quite a serious Philippine 
Communist threat. Stephen CuUnjieng explains the nation‟s Cold War mentality, being a 
strong American ally and located very close to Vietnam. He explains, 
First, this is a very Catholic country, and [Communism] was the Godless 
heathen ... Two, at that time it was a real battle between the two systems. 
Socialism and Communism hadn‟t been intellectually discredited yet and 
people didn‟t realize the excesses of the Cultural Revolution … You were 
either a romantic believer in Communism or socialism, or you were just 
God-fearing, you know, scared of the heathen government state … Marcos 
played on that fear very well.
265
 
 
In fact, neither was the Philippines nor Ferdinand Marcos alone in this situation and the 
trend within the larger Southeast Asian region was indeed moving towards more 
authoritarian and controlled states.  
Echoing this sentiment, Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata was attending the 
World Bank Meeting in Washington, DC when martial law was declared. He recounts 
that a senior reporter from the Department of State called him at about four in the 
afternoon and asked him if he was aware of the recent events.
266
 Mr. Virata had no 
foreknowledge of the declaration and when the reporter asked him how he felt, Virata 
replied, “We just joined the Asian people.”267 Virata clarifies, explaining, “Everything 
here [at the time] was Martial Law: Korea, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, 
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Singapore. Malaysia had their internal security act. So I said, „Well, we are now part of 
Asia as well.‟”268 
Therefore, despite Congressman Locsin‟s belief that it was not in the Philippine 
historical tradition to take so extreme an action, there was not only a history of strong 
executive action in the Philippines, but also within the larger context of Southeast Asia. 
This may have played into the Philippine people‟s justification of their situation. The 
Cold War context is precisely what gave Marcos the ability to so drastically extend the 
limits of the historical political tradition. Virata discusses the unique position that Marcos 
was in, explaining, 
[I]n 1966 … [the] war in Vietnam was raging. [Marcos] went on a State 
Visit to the U.S. and during the talks … they decided to call a SITO 
meeting here in the Philippines in 1966 [and] President Johnson came. He 
wanted … the Philippines to send fighting troops to Vietnam and Marcos 
resisted ... He did not [want] to send fighting troops, unlike [during] the 
situation in Korea in the early 50s, because during that time … we [were] 
under threat from the … Maoist group here, idolizing Chairman Mao with 
[his] revolutionary approach … [T]hen on the other hand, you have the 
Russians working largely through the East Europeans, getting in touch 
with our Leftist labor unions, and they [gave] rewards for striking, helping 
them, and so on ... So the pressures [were] really great and from a 
positional viewpoint … the Philippines … [was] unlike Japan, or Korea … 
[had] American bases [so] … we [were] not considered neutral.269  
 
Stephen CuUnjieng further reflects on the economic and social circumstances that 
fed into the public acquiescence, explaining, 
[W]hen martial law was declared … there was a lot of unrest in the streets; 
it was the Vietnam era, with student protests and walk-outs. People felt 
that the hippies and radicals were chaos, to which, most people said “Que 
horror, this chaos.” So people said lets have some order. Pre-martial law 
society was getting frayed, the rich were getting richer and the poor were 
getting poorer. It was not a healthy society that [Marcos] declared martial 
law into. The limits of the 1935 constitutional system of government were 
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staring to show. We were starting to fall behind economically, then there 
was also the oil shock … Part of the economic problem was that Marcos 
was overspending and using government funds for his reelection. But, 
there was also legitimate economic hardship and social chaos, which 
played into that. Therefore, the more traditional, conservative side said we 
need order and, frankly, martial law was legitimately popular in the early 
days. 
270
 
 
Among those of the more traditional, conservative side at the time, Supreme Court 
Justice under President Corazon Aquino, Florentino P. Feliciano, reflects on the reaction 
to and popularity of martial law, 
[Martial law was] popular among certain segments, because they were frightened. 
I suppose they were giving Mr. Marcos the benefit of the doubt. And of course the 
street demonstrations stopped so the middle income sector [was] happy about that, 
but for the lower income bracket it [didn‟t] make much difference.271 
 
With regards to his personal reaction, Justice Feliciano recounts, 
I remember my normal stance was, “this is something way beyond my 
power; there is nothing I can do.” So I took the stance of a detached 
observer, but within a few years…either the original purpose, the 
concealed original purpose, began to emerge, or – just to give him the 
benefit of doubt – the figure of … our infirm humanity manifested itself. 
When you have a population under tight control, you can do anything you 
want, which means, you can steal anything you want, you can force other 
people to give you their property … Or you throw your opponents in jail 
… All the frailties, weaknesses, human weaknesses, manifest themselves. 
It was a highly authoritarian government. The problem with an 
authoritarian government [is that], while it produces calm and order, 
almost everything depends on who the Martial Law administrator is, who 
the dictator is, and who the people around him are, because he cannot 
maintain himself, by himself, in power. He needs to create allies around 
him, and to create allies you have to give them bones.
272
 
 
Justice Feliciano‟s “detached observer” role became the nation‟s general code of conduct 
during the martial law years. Though regrettable and against the recent trend of 
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demonstrations in the 1970s, this is not surprising given the Philippines‟ long history of 
apathy to and acceptance of the politicians myriad misgivings. 
President Ramos explains, “In the beginning, those of us in the armed forces 
really supported the idea, but it lasted too long and became subject to abuse of power.”273 
President Ramos frames his support for martial law in terms that extend beyond merely 
communism, which explains his early cooptation into Marcos‟s “Rolex 12” group: 
[To] those of us in the armed forces and law enforcement, it was 
something that we could support because we felt that it would … return … 
the rule of law. We would be able to go after the private armies of the 
warlords in the provinces. [Over the first three years] we collected so 
many loose firearms and jailed a lot of abusive politicians who were 
breaking the law.
274
 
 
So it seems that from the beginning, Marcos – and to a degree, the “Rolex 12” – had 
intended for martial law to address a variety of issues, though they argued for it legally 
and to the public solely in terms of the Communist threat.  
This is what led the lawyers and intellectuals to realize in hindsight, that the 
Constitution Marcos would later enforce, specifically its Transitory Provisions, were, as 
Stephen CuUnjieng says, “just a sham”: 
Everything [was] just being doctored and contorted to fit what one man 
wants. It‟s a prostitution of the legal process where the letter of the law is 
followed but completely prostituting the spirit, which is to be frank very 
Marcos. You can‟t say anything didn‟t follow the rules, but it was sort of a 
perversion of the application of the rules, beyond any comprehension, then 
he changes how the rules apply so the next time he does something it‟s 
still valid.
275
   
 
This prostitution only fully applies to the sham Constitution, which ultimately 
allowed Marcos to establish personalistic rule. The public‟s tolerance and, above all, the 
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Supreme Court‟s silence, however, justified and legitimized Marcos‟s actions. In this 
way, the citizens and, more importantly, the judiciary were the culprits for allowing 
Marcos to bend the political tradition for his means. For this was not immediately a 
dictatorship. The contours of Ferdinand Marcos‟s authoritarianism developed only 
gradually and with the protection of full, though perverted, legal backing throughout. As 
Stephen CuUnjieng reports, 
That‟s why Ninoy [Aquino] was so disappointed. He said I expected there 
to be marching in the streets, but instead everyone stayed home. He said, 
“I was correct about Marcos, I was wrong about the Filipino people.”276 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM 
 Marcos described his regime as “constitutional authoritarianism.” He never 
openly attacked the impartiality or independence of the Supreme Court and instead relied 
on his constitutionally vested powers to appoint judges of his choice. Having banned all 
political parties and Congress, Marcos openly declared his actions to be subject to the 
judicial review of the Supreme Court. He assured that “the judiciary shall continue to 
function in accordance with its present organization and personnel.”277 Solicitor General 
Estelito Mendoza is quick to point out that the martial law regime readily received the 
suits that were brought against the government. He believes that though “somewhat 
paradoxical” given the state of crisis, this fact evidences that Marcos left the judiciary 
healthy, unimpaired, and fully functioning. Mendoza notes, 
In the ordinary concept of martial law, the government is superior and not 
subject to constraints resulting [in] judicial review. But, [this was] one of 
the primary, and I think important, decisions of President Marcos, which is 
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not fully appreciated … [He was in] a difficult position … the options 
were to disregard the complaints from the Supreme Court … to tell the 
Supreme Court that he declared a revolutionary government and thus was 
not subject to decisions of the courts – but that would mean suspension of 
the Constitution, and suspension of civil rights … [or] to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court … President Marcos decided on the 
second option … to take the position that martial law was proclaimed by 
the president under the Constitution and under conditions prescribed by 
the Constitution.
278
 
 
 Solicitor General Mendoza is right to point out that Marcos submitted his 
government to the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction, but he ignores the reasons why Marcos 
did so. It was not to preserve the constitutional process, which Marcos repeatedly 
prostituted, or to defend civil rights, which he ignored when it benefited him. Marcos saw 
the utility in leaving the courts intact and “independent.” Due to his legal background; 
however, he also instinctively, and sincerely, hesitated to attack the courts. Indeed, at no 
point did Marcos wish to declare to the world that he was establishing a dictatorship and 
that his rule would be absolute. Marcos took pains to cloak his actions with a semblance 
of legality instead, seeking to present to the international community and Filipino people 
that he was not departing from the past political tradition. For this reason, he made sure 
only to proceed with full, albeit perverted, legal backing.  
 Hon. Lazaro provides a clear example of this, recounting, 
[Marcos is] one fellow who would not commit anything illegal. If you tell 
him that it‟s … illegal he will not do it, but he will find some way to make 
it legal. For instance, there is a law … which says that all government 
properties must be insured by the GSIS … Roberto Benedicto, he wanted 
to [to be the one to] insure … some [government] properties … When 
[Marcos] was informed that, Benedicto, [despite the fact] that he was a 
political supporter [of Marcos], [could] not do it, because it was against 
the law. He had to pass the law to allow it, [which stated]: all government 
properties [will] be insured by the GSIS, except in cases as approved by 
                                                 
278
 Mendoza, Atty. Estelito. Personal Interview. 13 Aug. 2008. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09 
 
97 
the President … [So] if he approves it, it‟s legal … [and] no [longer] 
illegal. That‟s how legalistic [Marcos] was.279 
 
In his analysis, Lazaro doesn‟t focus on Marcos‟s prostitution of the law to fit his needs. 
Rather, he applauds Marcos for his insistence upon obtaining legal support to his actions. 
Unfortunately, this entirely ignores the fact that Marcos had to first break the law in order 
to gain such legal backing. 
 In a larger context, however, if Marcos could achieve his desired goals alongside 
an “independent” judiciary all the better. For a functioning, unimpaired court could only 
serve to protect his powers from charges of foul play by the opposition. An independent 
judiciary was thus, his most useful defense. To these points, Atty. Ricardo J. Romulo 
comments,  
During martial law [the courts] were totally supine, anything Marcos 
ordered with regards to martial law was „amen‟. But I would like to say 
that with regards to plain civil cases, by which I mean corporate work and 
that sort of thing, where Marcos did not intervene, [the courts] were quite 
unbiased and competent.
280
 
 
With regards to martial law, it would only be later, as a consequence of the March 31
st
, 
1973 Javellana v. The Executive Secretary case that the judiciary became locked in a 
state of inertia, effectively powerless for the rest of the martial law regime. Had they 
decided to rule differently, perhaps the Supreme Court could have played a different rule 
under martial law, for at this early stage, Marcos had indeed given them one rare 
opportunity to do so.  
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THE 1973 CONSTITUTION 
With the declaration of martial law, Marcos ordered the arrests of the anti-Marcos 
Constitutional Convention delegates. After such an attack, the rest bowed to Marcos in 
fear. The ConCon, nevertheless, preserved their decision to switch to a parliamentary 
system and the constitution‟s new tone of social consciousness. Marcos mandated the 
creation and inclusion of the Transitory Provisions, however, which allowed him to 
remain President and de facto dictator, ruling without a legislature. Marcos never truly 
implemented the new constitution, never elected a new prime minister, and in the end the 
Transitory Provisions ruled the country.  
The 1973 Constitution changed the governmental system from a presidential US 
structure to a parliamentary one. Therefore, the position of the president became merely a 
symbolic post, with the powers to: 
1) “Address the National Assembly at the opening of its regular session”; 
2) “proclaim the election of the Prime Minister”; 3) “dissolve the National 
Assembly and call for a general election as provided (for)”; 4) “accept the 
resignation of the Cabinet as provided (for)”; 5) “attest to the appointment 
or cessation from office of members of the Cabinet, and of other officers 
as may be provided by law”; 6) “appoint all officers and employees in his 
office in accordance with the Civil Service Law”; and 7) “perform such 
other duties and functions of state as may be provided by law.”281 
 
The New Society‟s unicameral National Assembly was, thus, the center of power. Article 
VIII, Section 3, sub-section 1 set the term limit of its members at six years and Section 4 
restricted the office to natural-born Filipinos.
282
 According to Article VIII, the National 
Assembly held the power to depose the Prime Minister with a majority vote for a 
successor (Section 13, sub-section 1) and ratify treaties (Section 14, sub-section 1). The 
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National Assembly also held the “sole power to declare the existence of a state of war” 
(Section 14, sub-section 2).
283
 
 When he seized emergency powers, Marcos only allowed the judiciary to 
continue to operate independently. With respect to the judiciary‟s functioning and its role 
within the separation of powers, the new constitution instituted no serious changes from 
the 1935 Constitution.
284
 The Supreme Court could act as a single body, en banc, or in 
two divisions, and the types of cases it could hear, as well as its procedure for appeals, 
remained the same.
285
 There were some changes from the 1935 Constitution. Article X, 
Section 2, sub-section 1 enlarged the Supreme Court from eleven to fourteen associate 
justices and one chief justice.
286
 Insignificantly, Justices were also now required to be 
natural-born citizens, but otherwise the qualifications remained the same. Lastly, the 
Constitution created the Sandiganbayan, a constitutional court specifically designed to 
try public officials for charges of graft and corruption, which was an unprecedented, 
though ultimately ineffective, innovation in Philippine judicial history
287
 
  
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS 
The most offensive portion of the 1973 Constitution was Article XVII, the 
Transitory Provisions. The Transitory Provisions were supposed to ensure a smooth 
transition from the 1935 Constitution to the new charter, but this proved to be hollow. 
First, Article XVII, Section 2 provides for an interim National Assembly, mandating: 
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The members of the interim National Assembly shall be the incumbent 
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, those who served as 
President of the nineteen hundred and seventy-one Constitutional 
convention, those Members of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives who shall express in writing to the Commission on 
Election…their option to serve therein, and those Delegates…who have 
opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for this Article...
288
 
 
Only 15 out of 317 delegates voted against Article XVII, prominent among them were 
Rev. Pacifico A. Ortiz, S.J., Enrique Voltaire R. Garcia II, Jose Mari Velez, Raul S. 
Manglapus, and Heherson T. Alvarez.
289
 In addition to applying heavy political pressure, 
Marcos offered potential interim National Assembly members 216,000 pesos annually for 
salary and expenses, and as Rolando V. del Carmen notes, “the attractiveness of this self-
induced offer must have been irresistible to all but the most patriotic of delegates!”290 
The ultimate purpose of the provisions was to enable Ferdinand Marcos to replace 
any government official at will and to validate all his martial law decrees.
291 
Section 3, 
sub-section 2 declares: 
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, 
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the 
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the 
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless 
modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, 
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, unless 
expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National 
Assembly.
292
 
 
Furthermore, sub-section 2 of Article XVII stated that the incumbent President:  
[S]hall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and Prime Minister … 
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until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the Interim 
President and Prime Minister.
293  
 
No definite date for this election was set, for it would take an indefinite period of time to 
create his New Society, and the Philippines endured thirteen and a half years under 
Ferdinand Marcos. The Constitutional Convention unilaterally ratified this new 
Constitution on November 30
th
, 1972.
294
 Marcos then issued a decree allowing for free 
debate of the Charter provisions and scheduling a plebiscite to vote by secret ballot on 
January 15
th
, 1973.
295
 This concession never materialized. As scholar Benjamin Muego 
observes, 
Through a complicated set of Supreme Court decisions, edicts, referenda, 
and clever and astute political maneuvers, Marcos was able to discharge 
the powers of the president under the 1935 Constitution and those of prime 
minister under the 1973 Constitution. In short, he was the legislative and 
executive, all rolled into one.
296
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CHAPTER NINE: LEGITIMIZATION 
A NEW JUDICIARY 
 Though the Constitution protected the Supreme Court, the lower courts were 
subject to various encroachments. With the Transitory Provisions allowing President 
Marcos to act as both the executive and legislature, he could have abolished the lower 
courts or modified them to his liking.
297
 In fact, the September 22
nd
, 1972 General Order 
No. 3 did just that, effectively granting immunity to those carrying out Marcos‟s orders 
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081.
298
 The order removed from the civil courts‟ 
jurisdiction: 
1) Those [cases] involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any 
decree, order or acts issued, promulgated or performed by [him] or by 
[his] duly designated representatives pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, 
dated September 21, 1972. 
2) Those involving crimes against national security and the Law of 
Nations. 
3) Those involving crimes against the fundamental laws of the State. 
4) Those involving crimes against public order. 
5) Those crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title, and 
improper use of names, uniforms, and insignia. 
6) Those involving crimes committed by public officers.
299
 
 
These cases were, instead, redirected to military tribunals, where President Marcos‟s 
authority was most protected. This situation comes often as a consequence of escalating 
war or crises of national defense. The Cold War gave the means for a president, working 
from a history of bossist, personal rule, to establish such a regime. Yet, the military 
tribunals acting according to Marcos‟s desires was also, functionally, just a more radical 
version of the judiciary consistently turning a blind eye to abuses. 
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With regards to lower court judges, the 1973 Constitution removed all legislative 
checks on the executive‟s appointing privileges and vested this power exclusively in the 
prime minister.
300
 The Supreme Court, however, assumed a disciplinary power over 
lower court judges that had previously been the authority of the executive. The 1973 
Constitution lowered the mandatory retirement age to 65, down from 70 as the 1935 
Constitution prescribed. This alteration gave Marcos the legal means to replace some of 
the older Supreme Court justices and appoint loyalists in their place. Even tenure in the 
Supreme Court seemed uncertain, however, for Section 10 of the Transitory Provisions 
stated that incumbent justices could remain in office “unless sooner replaced.” 
In addition to General Order No. 3, the 1973 Constitution did, very subtly, also 
manage to alter the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court enjoyed original 
jurisdiction over “cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and 
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,” 
and the appellate power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or 
certiorari” lower court decisions in five areas.301 The Supreme Court possessed the power 
of judicial review and the authority to declare unconstitutional any treaty, law, ordinance, 
executive agreement, or executive order. With regards to its appellate jurisdiction, 
however, whereas the 1935 Constitution designated “all cases in which an error or 
question of law is involved,” the 1973 Constitution restricted this to “cases in which only 
an error or question of law is involved. [Emphasis mine.]”302 
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The Supreme Court‟s power to declare an “executive agreement” unconstitutional 
now required ten concurring votes, an alteration that raised considerable, albeit quiet, 
concern among law students and legal scholars at the time.
303
 Lastly, Article X also 
required that within thirty days of the opening of the National Assembly, the judiciary 
submit an “annual report on the operations and activities of the judiciary.”304 “This 
seemed to indicate, at least on the surface,” Muego argues, “a diminution of the judiciary 
into a subordinate branch in relation to the executive and legislative branches.”305 
Despite operating under the a time of crisis, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza 
asserts that the government did not win every case brought to the Supreme Court, simply 
because it was martial law. “I would like to think,” he says, “[that] we won the cases on 
the merits.” He offers the explanation that Marcos appointed exceptionally qualified 
justices, specifically noting the role that their background played in empowering the 
executive branch. Mendoza elaborates, 
One significant aspect which should be noted, and maybe this helped, is 
that [Marcos] appointed to the Supreme Court, several who were, at one 
time, solicitor generals … There are many cases [brought to] the Supreme 
Court, which do not involve direct application of the law, but in which 
political considerations [come into play] … A solicitor general, because he 
has been [a] lawyer for the government…as Justice, [will] go to the 
Supreme Court with a familiarity and … understanding of the interests of 
the government. So with that in mind, I would not say there is a likelihood 
that he [will] decide in favor the government, but one can be certain [that] 
when he makes his decision he‟s not going to ignore what the interests of 
government are.
306
 
 
Over the course of martial law, several times the Supreme Court abstained from deciding 
a case, stating that it was a political question and beyond their scope. Perhaps that is what 
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Mendoza means when he mentions the “interests of the government” with regards to such 
questions. However, appointing politically and government minded, former Solicitor 
Generals as Justices, politicizes the judiciary, which is precisely what the Supreme 
Court‟s design aims to prevent. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
Ferdinand Marcos paid great deference to the Supreme Court and when he would 
defend his actions, reminded the public that he subjected his administration to the 
Supreme Court‟s review all throughout. He truly submitted himself to judicial review 
during Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, however, the Supreme Court, as it 
historically did, sided with the executive. After this, having outmaneuvered the judiciary 
and legally cornered them, Marcos could easily boast that he submitted himself to the 
judiciary, because he knew the Supreme Court wouldn‟t defy him.  
President Marcos‟s martial law decrees included clauses that exempted the crisis 
regime‟s actions from the judiciary‟s jurisdiction.307 He gave military jurisdiction to 
almost all criminal cases and exempted crimes by public officials and crimes against 
public order from the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction.308 The Supreme Court was not 
accustomed to such a lack of independence, and thus, initially didn‟t hesitate to hear 
cases against the validity of President Marcos‟s martial law decrees.309  
When Marcos drew up the new 1973 Constitution and called a plebiscite to have 
it ratified, the Supreme Court accepted petitions challenging Marcos‟s calling of a 
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plebiscite. On January 21
st
, 1973, The New York Times cited that many were charging 
Marcos with “inflating the dangers stemming from the relatively small number of 
Communist-led insurgents as a means of making himself into a dictator,” and that the tide 
was turning against Marcos and his new constitution.
310
  
Headed by Lorenzo Tañada, a Harvard Law School graduate, a noted 
civil-rights attorney and, until recently, a luminary of the Philippine 
Senate, the opposition groups have been seeking an injunction by the 
Philippine Supreme Court to prevent Mr. Marcos from putting into effect a 
new authoritarian constitution … Mr. Marcos was going to submit the new 
charter to a national plebiscite. Mr. Tañada and eight other petitioners 
asked the Supreme Court in mid-December to prohibit the plebiscite. They 
argued that the new charter had been improperly adopted, was a 
contradictory, unfit and undemocratic document, and was being put to the 
people by the President in violation of the rights of Congress under the old 
Constitution. In any case, they argued, a fair vote on a new constitution 
was impossible under martial-law suppression of free speech.
311
 
 
The New York Times also reported on January 12
th
, 1973, that though martial law 
had at first won “grudging acceptance,” because “after years of dangerous drift toward 
anarchy, many … welcomed an apparent sharp drop in crime and promise of real reform, 
including the proclamation of a new land reform measure,” this initial attitude was 
beginning to thin:
312
 
[T]he most telling evidence of dissatisfaction with the present regime in 
Manila can be found in President Marcos‟ own recent decisions to defer a 
scheduled Jan. 15 plebiscite on his new Constitution and to suppress 
public debate on the proposed charter, which would permit an indefinite 
extension of martial rule.
313
  
 
President Marcos decision to postpone the plebiscite rested upon his claims that 
“Filipinos had slipped back into their old habits and that the enemies of the state were 
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taking advantage of the debate to foment anxiety, confusion, discord, and subversion.”314 
After banning free debate of the charter and ordering that the spread of rumors be 
punishable by death, on December 31
st
, 1972, Marcos issued Proclamation Decree No. 
86. This organized national Citizens Assemblies for an informal referendum and open 
vote on the new constitution.
315
 With Citizens Assemblies ratifying the new constitution, 
the Supreme Court had no choice but to disregard the previous petitions. 
 
“A SHOW OF HANDS” 
 In flagrant violation of electoral laws and previous promises, the constitution was 
ratified by “a show of hands.” On January 17th, 1973, Proclamation No. 1102 
“Announcing The Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by the 
1971 Constitutional Convention,” declared the constitution ratified with a 95% vote.316 
These newly created Citizens Assemblies “were created in barrios, in municipalities and 
in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated 
December 31, 1972.”317 These assemblies were composed of:  
[A]ll persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least 
six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and 
who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the 
barrio, district or ward secretary.
318
 
 
This was quite a political innovation, which Marcos claimed to have designed to 
“broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample 
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opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues,” his ban 
on free debate notwithstanding.
319
 
 The proclamation states that the questions, “Do you approve of the new 
Constitution?” and “Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new 
Constitution?” were posed to the Citizens Assemblies.320 The proclamation then reads: 
14,976,561 … members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted 
for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against … 743,869 … 
who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the 
people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new 
Constitution … 14,298,814 … answered that there was no need for a 
plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should 
be considered as a vote in the plebiscite.
321
 
 
Marcos‟s subsequent proclamations, Proclamation No. 1103 and No. 1104, abolished the 
Transitory Provisions‟ call for an interim National Assembly and imposed the 
continuation of martial law for an indefinite period of time.
322
 
On January 22
nd
, 1973, the Supreme Court dismissed all ten petitions challenging 
Marcos‟ ability to substitute a plebiscite to pass the 1973 Constitution. Nine out of ten 
members of the Supreme Court declared the question “moot and academic,” with only 
Justice Calixto Zaldivar dissenting.
323
 Zaldivar along with Chief Justice Roberto 
Concepcion and Justice Querube Makalintal were the only non-Marcos Supreme Court 
appointees at the time.
324
 Marcos proclaimed that this decision had opened the way for 
the Constitution‟s full enforcement. In a public statement, he said: 
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Henceforth, there should be no hesitation on the part of anyone in the 
implementation of the new Constitution … The ratification is an 
accomplished fact. The new Constitution is in full force and effect by the 
sanction of the people.
325
 
 
TOWARDS A “NEW SOCIETY” 
 President Marcos wasted no time before officially enlarging the scope of his 
programmatic intentions. With regards to this, Justice Feliciano reflects, 
A lot of people think that [Marcos] and Ponce Enrile stage-managed the 
thing … but Mr. Marcos, as soon as Martial Law was declared, declared 
the objectives of his proclamation of Martial Law. It was not just to put 
down disorder or to prevent future upheavals, but rather to change society. 
Now that‟s as broad as you can get. If that is your objective you can do 
almost anything you want – and the declaration did not need any 
confirmation or consent of the legislative party. It was a unilateral act on 
the part of the Chief Executive and it was supposed to be a temporary 
situation.
326
 
 
Justice Feliciano went on to proclaim that martial law was merely “a big pretense,” 
which, of course, is what pushed Ninoy Aquino and the opposition to fight against 
Marcos. To the pro-Marcos camp, however, martial law was not only a time of order, but 
great achievement and progress.  
 To this day, Presidential Legal Counsel and Lawyer for the Office of Government 
Corporate Council under Marcos, Hon. Manuel L. Lazaro claims, 
First and foremost [Marcos] wanted what was good for the country. You 
will notice that when he declared martial law he wanted to have a new 
society. If you read all his books on a new society, he wanted to change 
the public, the people. Well, he succeeded in the first two years. He 
declared martial law in 1972. You wouldn‟t believe it. There was 
discipline for two years. You couldn‟t spit. Everybody just followed suit. 
[There were] no nightclubs, all nightclubs ended at about eight [PM]. 
[There was] no carrying of guns and things like that. [There was] no 
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problem [with] drugs. You know why? [During the] third year [of martial 
law], a fellow named Linseng, the most famous drug dealer, [Marcos] had 
him convicted and … shot publicly. [After that] there were no more drug 
dealers.
 327
 
 
Martial law undeniably instilled an order and discipline in Philippine society that had 
been absent before, however, it is Lazaro‟s contrary interpretation of the Marcos years 
and their significance that is so striking. Due to the particular political tradition of the 
Philippines, Lazaro‟s unabashed admiration for President Marcos doesn‟t blind him from 
the dictatorial nature of Marcos‟s regime. When Lazaro brushes aside the corrupt and 
self-motivated aspects to Marcos‟s rule, it is because they also drove the politicians that 
came before him. The difference to Lazaro is that Marcos was still able to achieve certain 
things for the Philippines. For example, Lazaro discusses the Transitory Provisions of 
Marcos‟s 1972 Constitution, reflecting, 
All of a sudden from … constitutional [rule] you [had] martial law, so you 
[had] to have a period of adjustment. Maybe what [was] not good [was 
that the Transitory Provisions gave] the President the power to suspend 
Congress and make the rules himself. But, if you had, had Congress, first 
of all, [Marcos] would not been able to come up with and enact all his 
programs.
328
 
 
 Fidel V. Ramos points out the holes beneath the New Society revolution after the 
first three successful years of martial law. Recalling his previous damnation of Mrs. 
Imelda Marcos‟s role in this history, Ramos details, 
[After] the first 3 yrs, this third force … the „conjugal dictatorship,‟ started 
to overpower everybody else. Then, [Marcos had gotten] rid of the old 
monopolies and oligarchs, but he created and established new monopolies 
and oligarchs. The country started to suffer and that [began] the outrage 
against his administration … Even before Ninoy‟s assassination, things 
were already going bad.
329
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JAVELLANA V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
The January 22
nd
, 1973 Supreme Court decision declaring the legality of the 1973 
Constitution‟s ratification process a “moot and academic” question, “did not deal 
squarely with the legality of the new Constitution.”330 Senators Diokno, Roxas, and 
Aquino, the National Press Club President Eduardo Monteclaro and two private citizens 
therefore filed four more suits, requesting that the Supreme Court void the new charter 
and bar its enforcement.
331
 The petitioners asked the judiciary to “save the Republic from 
the stark reality of a dictatorship.”332 They implored the Court to order a new plebiscite, 
in accordance with the 1935 Constitution, which they declared to be still in force. In 
response, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza warned the Supreme Court not to interfere 
in an “essentially political question,” and maintained that the Citizens Assemblies‟ 
ratification was in “substantial compliance” of the 1935 Constitution.333  
Mendoza recounts the various threads to his defending argument in the Javellana 
v. Executive Secretary Case. He first asserts that it was a political question, citing that 
under the U.S. Constitution, various cases pertaining to revolutionary governments are 
exempt from judicial review.
334
 Then, he equates a plebiscite, referendum, and ballot vote 
equally, by virtue of their shared functional purpose. Mendoza explains, 
What [is] the point of voting through the ballot? It is really to determine 
the expression of the will of the voter. So the question really is whether 
the procedure that was adopted also demonstrated the will of the electorate 
and I argued that it did so … In each barangay there was a [vote], 
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although by show of hands. Then there was a canvass of the results, and 
[once all] consolidated together … one can say that, although not strictly 
in accordance with the requirements of the constitution, the approval by 
the people … has been manifested accurately … To the question … [as to] 
whether the plebiscite … is in accordance with the constitution, I would 
order that if the purpose of the plebiscite is to determine the will of the 
people … it‟s better decided by the people themselves.335 
 
In their decision for the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case, delivered on March 
31
st, 1973, the Supreme Court states that, “Six Justices agree that the issue of the validity 
of Proclamation 1102 (announcing the ratification of the proposed Constitution) is a 
justiciable question; four Justices differ.”336 According to Article XV, Section 1 of the 
1935 Constitution the only means of ratifying a new constitution is through “an election 
or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly 
registered voters.”337 Yet, though the Supreme Court decided that the ratification was not 
in “substantial compliance of the law,”  
[F]our Justices hold that the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in 
by the people; two Justices hold that the people have not expressed 
themselves; one Justice thinks the doctrine of „Constitution by 
acquiescence‟ inapplicable; while the three other justices agree that they 
lack the knowledge or competence to make a determination.
338
  
 
Benjamin Muego explains that, “if the court‟s decision appeared contradictory, it was 
intended to be so,” because, as Rolando V. del Carmen observes, the decision was, 
Strongly reminiscent of Justice [John] Marshall‟s judicial technique 
employed in Marbury v. Madison where that great Chief Justice adroitly 
obtained pragmatic legal results without unduly forsaking idealistic 
allies.
339
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Therefore, because the Court could not obtain the six votes required to decide 
whether the public had acquiesced in the constitution or to declare the new constitution 
not in force, the Constitution, which was in de facto operation, continued to be in force. 
Rolando V. del Carmen writes in the Asian Survey, “It is here that President Marcos‟ 
unilateral ratification proclamation of January 17, 1973, assumed the proportion of a far-
sighted anticipatory legal strategy.”340 Indeed, Atty. Romulo reminds that “[President 
Marcos] was meticulous at making sure that there was always a semblance of legality to 
anything he did.”341  
It is notable that the Supreme Court did not issue an outright endorsement for the 
constitution, for they held that the ratification process was not in substantial compliance 
with the 1935 Constitution. Yet, given an opportunity to assert the rule of law and 
denounce Marcos‟s actions, the Supreme Court crumbled. In consequence, Javellana v. 
Executive Secretary inadvertently legitimized President Marcos‟s ruling and undermined 
the Supreme Court‟s basis for challenging President Marcos in the future.342 The 
judiciary‟s indecision and inability to challenge the new constitution was the turning 
point for Marcos‟s regime. 
Having succeeded in putting the 1973 Constitution in force, President Marcos 
gained enormous power. In his column in the Philippine Inquirer, Father Joaquin Bernas, 
the leading Philippine constitutional scholar, writes,  
President Ferdinand Marcos had it so good. When he needed to act in a 
decisive manner, he could always invoke Amendment 6 of the 1973 
Constitution. Amendment 6 gave him tremendous power. It said: 
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„Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists 
a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the 
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is 
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment 
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the 
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of 
the law of the land.‟ The possibility of using this provision solely 
depended on the judgment of the President.
343
 
 
The ratification of the 1973 Constitution and the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case 
served to be the most pivotal of the Marcos years. Not only did it grant him full powers, it 
legitimized his actions before the law and undercut the opposition‟s arguments against 
him.  
The Supreme Court had not been coerced into rendering their decision, though 
they did feel the political pressures surrounding their verdict. This, however, is no 
different from the “political questions” that they had decided in the past. As they did 
three times before, the Supreme Court once again bowed to the executive branch. In this 
way, though more extreme than his historical predecessors, the Supreme Court extended 
the political tradition to include Marcos.  
Though the Supreme Court had long operated alongside blatant political 
violations of the rule of law, being a passive body with powers to decide only those cases 
brought before them, the Court could turn a blind eye. Now, when confronted with the 
question as to what was officially acceptable, the Supreme Court did not rise to assert the 
Constitutional constraints upon the executive. In keeping with its historical political 
tradition, the Court decided in favor of Marcos, turning a blind eye to his abuse. In this 
way, though Marcos‟s actions were more extreme, the Supreme Court redefined the 
traditional limits by legitimizing his actions, to embrace him within it.  
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POLITICAL PRESSURES 
Father Bernas explains why the Supreme Court couldn‟t persuade a majority 
against Marcos in Javellana v Executive Secretary: 
[One has] to understand the situation there; my own estimate is that even 
if the Supreme Court majority had rejected the position of President 
Marcos, it would not have made any difference. The [judiciary] was 
thinking: “It‟s better for us to be here than to be completely eliminated.”344  
 
President Marcos‟s guarantee of the judiciary‟s independence effectively backed the 
Supreme Court into a corner. Granted precarious and precious independence, the 
Supreme Court felt pressure to act in Ferdinand Marcos‟s favor in order to secure their 
existence. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court “independently” choosing to do so 
legitimized Marcos‟s rule and established a self-imposed restriction against challenging 
the crisis regime in the future.  
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary limited the Supreme Court‟s scope and 
depth of decision-making and rendered the judiciary powerless against the crisis 
regime.
345
 In his early days, Marcos also enjoyed great popularity and support within the 
Supreme Court and general public. When Chief Justice Concepcion retired after the 
Javellana v. Executive Secretary decision, the Supreme Court lost its staunch Marcos 
opponent. Afterwards, President Marcos only bolstered his support within the 
judiciary.
346
 Thus, political scientist Neal C. Tate writes,  
By the end of 1974 the Philippine judiciary was no longer in a position to 
provide any serious check on the martial law regime. Until the end of the 
crisis regime, the Supreme Court rendered not a single decision that posed 
even a mild threat to Marcos‟ rule. To achieve this result, the President 
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never had to use or threaten coercion on the judges nor did he have to 
replace oppositionist judges.
347
  
 
Atty. Romulo laments, “[President Marcos] was a first rate lawyer, a brilliant mind, 
before people knew it, he established the trap and then it was too late for the Supreme 
Court to challenge him.”348 Marcos‟s military support, being Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces and ruling under martial law, also naturally convinced the judiciary that 
dissenting against him would be pointless.  
During martial law, the judiciary was not a shield against the authoritarian 
regime‟s power, but rather, an extension of Marcos‟s power and legitimacy. Marcos 
clearly saw this potential, but, at least initially, also genuinely respected the Court‟s 
judicial powers. President Marcos possessed a powerful legal mind and the nation 
considered him something of a legend in that respect. The Philippine public thus allowed 
him great flexibility with regards to constitutional matters and trusted his expertise. Such 
expertise, however, is what enabled President Marcos to carefully plan his actions in 
order to secure maximum long-term benefits. Rolando V. del Carmen posits,  
At the same time, [his legal expertise] may have instilled in him a degree 
of trepidation for what might be construed in the country and abroad as 
gross violations of basic constitutional precepts.
349
 
 
Though the new constitution gave him power to subdue the courts, Marcos 
realized that it was not in his favor to do so. The Court remained tractable and served the 
crisis regime exceedingly well, protecting President Marcos‟s seizure of power and 
shielding him from criticism or opposition.
350
 While, ultimately, the Supreme Court‟s 
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legitimization bent the Philippine political tradition‟s limits to include him. Marcos‟s rule 
embodies the worst flaws and tendencies of the historical political tradition, yet it was the 
Cold War context that empowered him. Alongside the Supreme Court, the Cold War also 
changed the normal limits of the Philippine political tradition and legitimized Marcos‟s 
actions. President Marcos was not a necessary inevitability of the historical political 
tradition, but blame nevertheless falls upon the larger system as well. The historical 
tradition adversely created a Marcos, who would succeed in bringing it to its most 
extreme form. 
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CHAPTER TEN: ANSWERING THE OPPOSITION 
MARTIAL LAW DECISIONS 
 Ferdinand Marcos promoted Makalintal to Supreme Court Chief Justice. He was 
one of the two justices who, despite its ratification process, voted in favor of Marcos‟s 
Constitution to ensure “successful implementation of his social and economic 
reforms.”351 In addition to Makalintal, Marcos also appointed former Senator Estanislao 
Fernandez, University of the Philippines law professor Ramon Aquino, and Court of 
Appeals Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma, thereby making all but one justice
352
 of the 
Supreme Court Marcos supporters.
353
 This imbalance heavily affected the Supreme Court 
decisions to come. 
 Thirty-one political prisoners, including Senators Ninoy Aquino and Jose Diokno, 
had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which remained pending until 1974 when the 
Supreme Court finally heard the case.
354
 By 1974, the Supreme Court was firmly in 
Marcos‟s pocket, therefore, he could confidently allow the Supreme Court to rule on the 
petition. Marcos declared, “By mere fact of submission to the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court we have allowed the elimination of the power to summarily arrest any person.”355 
Yet, still, The New York Times reports: “Mr. Marcos refused to say if he would free Mr. 
Diokno if the Supreme Court granted him the writ.”356  
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The petition charged that when Marcos had declared martial law, no state of 
rebellion or insurrection existed, to which Chief Justice Makalintal responded: “such a 
claim ignores the sophisticated modern setting [which] includes subversion of the most 
subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual 
fighting.”357 The Court decided on September 17th, 1974 to uphold “the government‟s 
right to rule under martial law, detain persons without charges and restrict freedoms once 
released from jail.”358 On the last point, Chief Justice Makalintal explains, 
The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the 
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law necessarily 
implies the power to impose upon released detainees conditions and 
restriction which are germane and necessary to carry out the purposes of 
the proclamation.
359
 
 
All the Marcos-appointed Justices, except the former civil libertarian, Justice Fernando, 
concurred. Though he supported the rest of the decision as a whole, Fernando still filed a 
“qualified dissenting opinion” against the provision.360 Additionally, The New York Times 
reports,  
While recognizing the constitutional basis of the President‟s proclamation 
[of martial law] and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, several 
justices asserted in separate opinions that the court had the power to 
scrutinize acts of the martial-law [g]overnment to determine whether they 
had resulted in manifest transgressions of liberty.
361
  
 
Five out of the eleven justices declared the legality of martial law to be beyond 
their scope, but Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma “reviewed published accounts of 
disturbances in the three-year period before President Marcos assumed emergency 
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powers and agreed that a state of rebellion had existed.”362 The six justices then 
concluded that President Marcos had exercised his constitutional prerogative 
appropriately, given the situation, and without arbitrariness.
363
 This decision allowed 
Marcos to announce to the world in a press-conference three days later, on the two-year 
anniversary of martial law, that, 
The power of the President is not absolute. For one thing, before I 
proclaimed martial law I sought to establish what would have been a 
coalition government. I asked the opposition parties to join me in the fight 
against rebellion, but my offer was rejected peremptorily. I submitted 
myself to the Supreme Court, not only once but several times. I would like 
to know if any dictator would do that.
364
 
 
For their part, Supreme Court Justices Antonio and Fernandez traveled to 
Filipino-American communities in the United States and gave speeches in defense of 
martial law. In a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the United States House of Representatives, Justice Fernandez assured 
Donald Fraser that,  
There [had] been no violation of human rights by the government because 
our Supreme Court [had] already declared that the proclamation and 
continuance of martial law [was] in accordance with out Constitution and 
that, therefore, those arrested and detained by virtue thereof, [were] legally 
under detention and cannot be said to have been deprived illegally of their 
constitutional rights.
365
 
 
In Honolulu, Justice Antonio argued that under Marcos, “institutions like the judiciary 
can … function as they ought to in view of the „elimination‟ of politics from the 
system.”366 Whereas, in the past, Antonio pointed out, “the power and interference of 
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politicians impeded the swift and smooth flow of justice.”367 In truth, Marcos, like 
politicians before him, was still impeding the flow of justice, just more skillfully. 
 
DOWN, NOT OUT 
 Between 1974 and 1977, the Supreme Court remained effectively subdued. With 
regards to Senator Ninoy Aquino‟s fate in prison, however, like the Filipino people, the 
Supreme Court would not submit to Ferdinand Marcos‟s will. Ninoy had become their 
hero – their only reassurance that Marcos could not rule indefinitely. When after a four-
year trial, the military tribunal court condemned Aquino to death on the charges of 
murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms, the Supreme Court reacted 
instinctively, albeit tentatively.  
Aquino‟s conviction sparked an international outcry, moving Ferdinand Marcos to 
“reopen” the case and allow Ninoy to present further evidence.368 The seven deciding 
army officers only confirmed Senator Aquino‟s prior conviction. It was at this juncture, 
on December 15
th
, 1977, that the Supreme Court requested a delay of any further action 
while they decided Aquino‟s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.369 Fox Butterfield in 
the New York Times, reports that the usually intractable Solicitor General Estelito 
Mendoza, “immediately agreed to the Supreme Court‟s request, which seemed carefully 
phrased to avoid an open challenge to Mr. Marcos.”370  
According to Butterfield, when answering questions on December 15
th
, 
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Several of the justices seemed sympathetic to Mrs. [Aquino] and sharply 
critical of the military tribunal‟s conduct of the trial. It was a reflection of 
the curious nature of martial law in the Philippines to see one of the 
Government‟s chief law officials publicly and sharply questioned on the 
conviction of an opposition figure. Ironically, Justice Antonio Barredo, 
who in the past has appeared at rallies for Mr. Marcos and had spoken on 
the President‟s behalf, was one of the most critical of the Government‟s 
actions. “I for one feel personally offended that the military commission 
did not wait for us to rule,” he said, referring to the petition of Mr. 
[Aquino‟s] mother.371 
 
This was a moment of great significance, being the first time in five years that the 
Supreme Court overturned an action of Ferdinand Marcos‟s. The Supreme Court never 
decided Mrs. Aquino‟s case. They continued to delay their ruling to keep Ninoy alive 
without having to overtly defy Marcos. 
 Later, on May 10
th
, 1982, Ferdinand Marcos accepted the resignation of all 
fourteen Supreme Court Justices, following allegations that Justice Vicente Ericta‟s son‟s 
bar examination results had been changed the month before.
372
 Marcos did so to restore 
“the prestige, integrity, and good name” of the high court and “in order to create a new 
court, without the burden of the tarnished prestige of the present Supreme Court.”373 Four 
days later, President Marcos swore in 15 new members to the Supreme Court, reseating 
among them Chief Justice Enrique Fernando. Fernando admitted to “blurred judgment” 
and expressed gratitude for Marcos‟s move to instill “new confidence” in the Supreme 
Court, promising: “We will try to live up to it.”374 This scandal only draws into further 
clarity, the true nature of the Philippine political tradition, from which the Supreme Court 
itself isn‟t exempt.  
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 Corruption existed even in the Philippines‟ highest court, bankrupting the notion 
that it served to uphold the rule of law. Not only did the judiciary fail to denounce 
Marcos‟s abuses, but also believed that it too could operate above the rule of law. This 
may complicate the Supreme Court‟s capacity to decide whether a party has acted in 
accordance to the rule of law at all. What does the Supreme Court‟s legitimation of 
Marcos‟s actions mean, in light of its own corruption? It was not only Marcos, but also 
the historical political tradition and system that he operated in, that were unhealthy. 
 The Court‟s legitimation was never proof that Marcos obeyed the rule of law, but, 
rather, further evidence that the political system operates above of the rule of law. The 
Supreme Court‟s approval only continued to protect the tradition from the burden of 
abiding by the law. Marcos did not break the system, but because of the Cold War, could 
bend it to include him. This achievement casts him, not as the aberration, but the 
apotheosis of the political tradition.  
 
THE NINOY STORY 
 In February 1978 Senator Aquino still remained in jail. When Marcos consented 
in 1978 to hold an Interim Assembly election, as the 1973 Constitution had promised, 
Ninoy pledged to run, even in handcuffs. This would be the first election in five years of 
martial law. Imelda Marcos agreed to head a government coalition ticket against him.
375
 
This consent to an election was supposed to be a relaxation of martial law. If so, it proved 
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shallow when the government denied Aquino‟s petition for temporary release in order to 
campaign, on the grounds that it would endanger national security.
376
 
 The government later allowed Ninoy Aquino to appear on television on March 
10
th
, 1978 to answer the campaign charges that he had worked for the CIA Stephen 
CuUnjieng recalls that on that day, there was nobody to be found on the streets, because 
all were watching Ninoy. President Marcos permitted Senator Aquino to run, but not 
outside his prison cell. His television appearance was his first in six years. The elections 
resulted in a decisive victory for Marcos‟s government coalition party and the opposition 
cried charges of fraud and ballot stuffing.
377
 In Metro Manila, the opposition‟s hub, 
somehow all twenty-one members of Marcos‟s government ticket managed to win, which 
indicated foul play. Marcos reacted to the charges against him by threatening 
demonstrators and ordering more arrests.  
 Finally, after seven and a half years of detention, in 1980, Ferdinand Marcos 
allowed Senator Aquino to leave jail and fly to the U.S. to receive a necessary coronary 
bypass. This permanently set aside the Supreme Court‟s pending decision for the writ of 
habeas corpus. In an address before the American Newspaper Publishers Association in 
Honolulu the month before, Ferdinand Marcos sought to prove that “authoritarianism 
need not be synonymous with tyranny.” He hoped that his concession to Aquino would 
be a demonstration of this.
378
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 On January 17
th
, 1981, after Aquino had left the country, Marcos officially lifted 
martial law. That same day, Marcos also released 341 prisoners, 159 of whom had 
violated national security and 182 of whom were common criminals. Henry Kamm in the 
New York Times writes that Pope John Paul II‟s upcoming visit and Ronald Reagan‟s 
election also explain the timing of Marcos‟s decision in 1981.379 “Mr. Marcos and his 
wife have consistently been reported as chafing under the Carter administration‟s 
emphasis on human rights,” Kamm reports, but, “Mr. Marcos was … encouraged … by a 
reported assurance from Mr. Reagan that he would treat the Philippines „as a major 
ally.‟”380 Therefore, Kamm continues, this decision is, “a gesture to invite Mr. Reagan to 
initiate a warmer relationship with a country that, despite its strong independence, 
continues to place great value on its ties to its former colonial ruler.”381 
 More than an invitation, however, Marcos had clear expectations when Reagan 
assumed office. The two had formed a friendship much earlier, during the beginning of 
martial law, when Reagan was still a first-term California governor. When Imelda 
Marcos was planning to unveil her pet project, The Philippine Cultural Center, she 
invited many heads of states, wishing to draw lavish attention to the Philippines and the 
achievements of martial law. President Nixon and all her other American invites rejected 
Mrs. Marcos‟s offer, so she turned to Governor Reagan. It was a flattering invitation for 
Reagan and, as was Mrs. Marcos‟s style, Mr. and Mrs. Marcos showed Nancy and 
Ronald a splendid time. This began the friendship that would determine much of 
Philippine-American relations over the dying days of the Marcos years. Aquino never 
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saw that ending. After a successful coronary bypass and spending some time in exile in 
the U.S., when he finally returned to the Philippines, on August 21
st
, 1983, Ninoy was 
assassinated upon sight. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: ABOVE THE RULE OF LAW 
THE END 
 Describing his immediate reaction upon hearing this news, Stephen CuUnjieng 
relates, 
Nobody felt safe after Ninoy died. Whether Imelda or someone higher up 
had him killed, we still don‟t know, but that day, real fear of Marcos‟s 
regime set in.
382
 
 
Steve Psinakis, a Greek businessman who had married into the Lopez family, was an 
unwavering Marcos critic and a close friend to Ninoy Aquino. On Ninoy‟s 25th death 
anniversary, Psinakis released previously classified documents for the first time, 
including a transcript of his final conversation with Ninoy right before he boarded the 
plane to Manila. The following are excerpts from that new, historical record, which has 
yet to be examined by academic scholars: 
… Now this is the latest, Steve, that I can give you – my source is 
Cardinal Sin … Number one, Marcos checked-in at the Kidney Center … 
The experts went, saw him, they did the test. He flunked all the tests and 
the conclusion was if they operate on him, it would be fatal … Apparently, 
they are now moving to put in Imelda, in effective control … that‟s the 
background that I‟m coming [into]…383 
 
Steve Psinakis then, reminded Ninoy, “That‟s the good part. The bad part is that the 
hardliners like [General Fabian] Ver who are bulldogs without any political savvy … 
may think they‟re next in line.”384 Ninoy replied: 
… [T]he rumor in Manila is that I am taking the private jet of Enrique 
from Hong Kong, but all planes have been guarded and they may close the 
airport on Sunday or turn back the plane if they will be able to pinpoint [it] 
... [Another] one … is [that] … they have two guys stationed to knock me 
out at the airport … [T]hey will try them for murder [afterwards, and] … 
                                                 
382
 CuUnjieng, Stephen. Personal Interview. 15 Aug. 2008. 
383
 Psinakis, Steve. “My Last Talk With Ninoy.” Transcript released 21 Aug. 2008. 
384
 Ibid. 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09 
 
128 
convict them, but [the two guys] have assurances … I am meeting with 
ASEAN leaders beginning Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. 
Indonesia‟s Suharto might receive me, Malaysia is already firm, and 
Thailand is just about firm. Now, Japan has sent word that if Imelda is in 
place, Nakasone is willing to use his economic clout … to tell Imelda, … 
„if you treat Aquino nicely, we can [have a] dialogue‟ … Nakasone is 
willing to send … a secret, private envoy with a personal letter making a 
plea for me … [promising] that if they … [can] come up with some kind 
of an understanding, Japanese economic assistance will continue … 
[T]hey are very uptight and if the woman takes over … there will be chaos 
… ASEAN today is already one region and any instability in one part of 
ASEAN will scare investors in the entire region … Now to what extent 
they can mitigate the hardliners, I don‟t know, that‟s the chance we have 
to take.
385
 
 
Then, referring to his chance of assassination, Ninoy continued: 
 
Those are the trump cards I am bringing home, which of course, can be 
negated if one character can blow me out…[But if not], … I will try to 
hold out for a meeting with Marcos. Now that he is about to meet his 
Maker, I am almost confident that I can talk to him and sell him 
something...
386
 
 
At this point, Psinakis asked Ninoy his last question, which was whether there was “any 
indication from the U.S. side that they might be somewhat helpful or cooperative.” Ninoy 
answered: 
No indication except that they are watching me and they are following all 
my steps … But I am still hopeful that … they will … eventually … 
because I don‟t think they‟re very happy with [the prospect of] the woman 
running the show …387 
 
 For the first time, this conversation proves that Ninoy understood quite clearly the 
dangers that he faced in deciding to return home. While exiled in the United States, 
however, Ninoy was certain that his place was at home, declaring that, “The Filipino is 
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worth dying for.” This conversation also provides further evidence that Marcos had been 
moving to install Imelda in his place, though that fact still remains unproven.  
 
THOSE AT FAULT 
 In the aftermath, Marcos appointed five jurists to a special commission, created to 
investigate Aquino‟s murder. Significantly, the Supreme Court accepted three suits 
challenging the panel‟s competence and the Marcos suspended the investigation hearings, 
pending the Supreme Court‟s decision.388 According to the official government account, 
Rolando Galman, described as a “professional gunman,” had killed Ninoy with a single 
bullet to the back of the head. After firing at Aquino, Galman “was killed by a fusillade 
of bullets by the security men surrounding Mr. Aquino.”389 Yet, “how Mr. Galman, who 
was wearing the uniform of the airport maintenance workers, managed to penetrate the 
tight security screen in effect for Mr. Aquino‟s arrival,” Robert Trumbell in the New York 
Times, writes, “is one of the unanswered questions in the case.”390 
 Aquino had been wearing a bulletproof vest and when Aquino stepped off the 
plane, two guards escorted him and patted him. Rolando Galman shot at Aquino first, but 
the subsequent onslaught of bullets, launched at the command: “Pusila, pusila,” makes it 
difficult to tell precisely which bullet ultimately killed Ninoy. “Pusila” is Waray, a dialect 
from Leyte, where Imelda and all her bodyguards were from. Marcos‟s bodyguards were 
exclusively Ilocano, which seems to shift the blame to Imelda. One must consider, 
however, Marcos‟s old tactic of deflecting the blame to Imelda. Additionally, given the 
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strictly authoritative nature of his rule, it is hard to believe that such an order was carried 
out without Marcos‟s approval.  
 Assassination was a step too far, however, even for Marcos, and it finally 
galvanized the Philippine people against him. Then, nothing, not his consent to hold 
presidential elections in 1985 or his subsequent “victory,” would turn back the tide. The 
clumsiness of this miscalculation is highly uncharacteristic for Ferdinand and may 
evidence that Imelda was behind it, not her husband. Perhaps, though, sickness and 
desperation had overcome him and it was indeed Marcos‟s hand.  
 In the undelivered speech that he had prepared for his arrival, Aquino declares, 
… I could have opted to seek political asylum in America, but I feel it is 
my duty, as it is the duty of every Filipino, to suffer with his people 
especially in time of crisis. I never sought nor have I been given any 
assurances, or promises of leniency by the regime. I return voluntarily 
armed only with a clear conscience and fortified in the faith that in the 
end, justice will emerge triumphant … Rather than move forward we have 
moved backward. The killings have increased, the economy has taken a 
turn for the worse and the human rights situation has deteriorated. During 
the martial law period, the Supreme Court heard petitions for habeas 
corpus. It is most ironic after martial law has allegedly been lifted, that the 
Supreme Court last April ruled it can no longer entertain petitions for 
habeas corpus for persons detained under the Presidential Commitment 
Order, which covers all so-called national security cases and which under 
present circumstances can cover almost anything.
391
  
 
Nowhere does Aquino denounce the failures of the other political bodies, besides the 
Supreme Court. This is natural, because it was the Supreme Court that had most directly 
betrayed him and refused to come to his aid in jail. Additionally, with regards to human 
rights, it did truly fall upon the Supreme Court to protect the Philippine people, and it 
repeatedly failed to do so.  
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 Aquino‟s speech continues, 
The country is far advanced in her times of troubles … These problems 
may be surmounted if we are united. But we can be united only if all the 
rights and freedoms enjoyed before September 21, 1972 are fully restored 
… There is a growing cadre of young Filipinos who have finally come to 
realize that freedom is never granted, it is taken. Must we relive the 
agonies and the blood-letting of the past that brought forth our republic or 
can we sit down as brothers and sisters and discuss our differences with 
reason and good will? 
 
Therein, Aquino summarizes the lesson that the Philippines never learned, because the 
U.S. ended their independence fight against Spain: “Freedom is never granted, it is 
taken.” Filipinos cannot wait for the Supreme Court to grant it and cannot wait for an 
unhealthy political tradition to correct itself.  
 
THE FINAL DAYS 
 Criticism plagued every iteration of the government commission Marcos assigned 
to investigate Aquino‟s assassination. Nonetheless, Marcos was genuinely shocked when 
on October 10
th
, 1983, the latest commission, comprised of four retired Supreme Court 
justices, dissolved itself and handed the President their resignation. Responding to 
charges that the justices were too biased, in their letter, they suggested to Marcos that the 
commission would enjoy greater respect and public standing if it included “members 
acceptable to all sectors of society.”392 
 Though their culpability was unproven, the Filipino people and Supreme Court 
could no longer justify Marcos‟s administration. Marcos‟s power ebbed increasingly. On 
October 25
th, 1983, the Supreme Court overturned the Manila city government‟s ban on 
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demonstrations and sanctioned protests at the United States Embassy against American 
bases in the Philippines. According to a New York Times article, the Supreme Court 
declared in their ruling that there was “insufficient proof to back up claims by city 
government, in issuing the ban, that Communist subversives would disrupt the march.”393 
Exhibiting a striking change of tone, Justice Vicente Abad Santos describes the 
Government as “paranoid,” immediately blaming the Communists “whenever anything 
negative happens.”394 
 On August 18
th
, 1984, the Supreme Court went further still. Dismissing the 
Government‟s claims that they would lead to “civil war,” the Court approved plans for 
demonstrations marking the one-year anniversary of Aquino‟s death.395 The Supreme 
Court stood with Ninoy against the Marcos government in their decision, describing 
Aquino as a “leader who decided to go back to his country to attain peace.”396 The Court 
approved the demonstrations, with assurance from its organizers that the marches and 
rally would be peaceful. Yet, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza issued grave warnings 
that the military had obtained intelligence indicating that the Communists had planned to 
position snipers along the marches‟ routes and infiltrate assassins into the rally.397 The 
Court still ordered security forces to “observe a [discrete] distance from the participants, 
with the duty of affording protection to the participants as well as to the general 
public.”398 
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 By this point, in 1984, martial law had already been lifted and the regime was 
only weakening. The military was breaking apart into competing factions, each plotting 
coup attempts against Marcos. President Ramos explains that at this point, “The armed 
forces of the Philippines were no longer [serving] the Philippines of the people, but … 
became the special armed forces of just an elite group based in Malacañang [Palace]. 
Therefore, I withdrew my support.”399 In addition to all this, Marcos himself was ravaged 
by his illness. The Supreme Court then finally began to rise against Marcos. 
 
THE MEANING OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 In 1973, Rolando V. del Carmen posed the following question in Asian Survey: 
On the balance sheet, the Court thus far has done the President more 
service than disservice, more good than harm. And as long as the court 
stays tractable, the President will be hesitant to resort to drastic measures 
to silence it. But whether the President is truly under the “rule of law” is 
another question which only he can ultimately answer, not through what 
he says but through what he does in the difficult months, years, or who 
knows – even decades – ahead.400  
 
In retrospect, Ferdinand Marcos did not operate under the rule of law, though he was 
obsessed with maintaining an appearance of constitutionality and thus, had a distinct 
respect for the law. Like past politicians, Marcos subverted the rule of law, but the 
difference lies in the unprecedented scope of his subversion. It is for this reason that he 
required the complicity of the Supreme Court. Observation of the proper rule of law had 
never been a true component of Philippine politics, but never too had the Courts 
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legitimization of this non-observation been. In successfully co-opting and 
outmaneuvering the judiciary, rather than break the tradition, Marcos extended it. 
By 1974, Rolando V. del Carmen writes, 
A close scrutiny of [the Supreme Court‟s] record during the period of 
martial law reveals that the judicial department has thus far survived 
adversity through a process of situational accommodation … It is also 
apparent that perhaps resultant of circumstances beyond its control, the 
judiciary can no longer be relied upon as the ultimate agency to which 
individuals may turn for effective redress against the excesses of 
government when all other means have failed. Given the realities of 
martial law, there is consolation in the fact that although shaken and 
weakened the courts still exist. This is much more than can be said of the 
erstwhile Philippine Congress, which has long since passed into oblivion 
with no immediate hopes of revival.
401
 
 
The Marcos years eventually proved the Supreme Court to be no better than the 
Congress, both ineffective and emasculated against Marcos‟s will. Petty but insistent 
subversion of the rule of law has always been the political norm and the Supreme Court‟s 
tolerance only further proves it.  
Naturally a reactive and, thus, passive political body, the Supreme Court could 
easily turn a blind eye to past politicians‟ sins, because it fell upon the public to submit 
petitions for review. Under a state of rebellion and declaration of martial law, however, 
the language of the 1935 Constitution strengthens the executive‟s power. For this reason, 
the Cold War context gave Marcos the tools necessary for his dictatorship, and alongside 
the judiciary, legitimized his actions. 
In retrospect, it is hard to imagine the judiciary acting otherwise, for as the 
interviews included here demonstrate, both the history and contemporary climate favored 
Marcos. The judiciary operated within a tradition that allowed its politicians to 
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unapologetically break the law. Marcos brought the tradition to its most extreme limits, 
but because of the judiciary‟s legitimization, it cannot be said that he broke it. What lies 
in stake in this question, whether Ferdinand Marcos was the aberration or apotheosis of 
the system, is a judgment of the health of the Philippine political system. When one 
considers what preceded and followed Marcos, particularly, the current President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo‟s ongoing attempts to remain in power, it is clear that the system itself 
is unhealthy. Not the aberration, Marcos instead embodies the Philippine political 
tradition‟s deepest ills. He has served to demonstrate to history, what the political 
mandate truly means to the Philippines‟ politicians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Nicole CuUnjieng, College „09 
 
136 
EPILOGUE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 
Immediately after the victory of the People Power Revolution of 1986, Corazon 
Aquino assumed power and issued Proclamation No. 1, stating, “As a first step to restore 
confidence in our administration, I expect all appointive public officials to submit their 
courtesy resignation beginning with the members of the Supreme Court.”402 Thereafter, 
President Aquino convened a Constitutional Commission to rewrite the Constitution and 
on June 2
nd
, 1986, forty-eight appointed members from various fields, began the task of 
writing the new Philippine Constitution.
403
 Atty. Romulo recounts, “We went around the 
country and tried to elicit the opinion of people as to the form of government they desired 
…. People wanted to elect their president; that was how they would express their 
views.”404  
The 1987 Constitution is the strongest window into how the public and Aquino‟s 
administration viewed the emasculation of the judiciary under Marcos. It articulates their 
conception of the judiciary‟s role within the balance of a proper separation of powers. 
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee‟s handwritten notes from the Constitutional 
Commission meetings highlight the importance of Article VIII, Section 1, which appears 
as the first among the list of changes to be made to the Constitution.
405
 Article VIII, 
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Section 1 outlines judicial power and greatly extends the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, defining judicial power to be:  
The duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving 
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine 
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to 
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality 
of the Government.
406
 
 
The power to decide whether or not there have been “grave abuses of discretion” allows 
the Supreme Court to settle political arguments. Previously, the Supreme Court tended to 
refrain from deciding upon political matters and authorities defended themselves against 
the judiciary by invoking the political nature of their actions, which was outside the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This political protection was the first provision that the 
Constitutional Commission removed. Importantly, because the phrase “grave abuses of 
discretion” is somewhat ambiguous, the provision can expand or contract according to 
the nature of the Supreme Court and its willingness to intervene in political matters.
407
  
The immediate attention that the Constitutional Commission paid to the 
judiciary‟s power and its role in protecting the people against the executive and 
legislative branch reflects the Supreme Court‟s ineffectiveness under President Marcos. 
In a further act of judicial empowerment, Article VIII, Section 5, Part 2 grants the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases regarding ambassadors, public ministers, consuls 
etc., and reserves for the high court, final judgment on the constitutionality of any 
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government decree or pronouncement.
408
 Additionally, under the 1987 Constitution, only 
Congress may grant the President emergency powers, stating:  
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, 
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions 
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a 
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the 
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
409
 
 
THE EMBOLDENED SUPREME COURT 
In the “1986 Annual Report on the Operations and Activities of the Judiciary,” 
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee writes,  
A free and independent Judiciary is imperative in any democratic society. 
The Constitution and democratic traditions may be upheld only through 
the judicial power that is vested exclusively in the „Supreme Court and in 
such lower courts as may be established by law.‟ (Article VIII, Section 1, 
1987 Constitution) The institution of judicial review serves as a check that 
every official act must be based on law that does not contravene the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution and that it be performed 
conformably to law.
410
 
 
President Marcos‟s long “constitutional authoritarianism” deeply scarred the Philippines. 
Recognizing the judiciary‟s recent inadequacies and failures, the Constitutional 
Commission wrote the 1987 Constitution with the explicit intent of preventing a crisis 
executive from manipulating the judiciary in order to perpetuate a crisis regime‟s 
assumption of power.  
In the “1986 Annual Report of the Supreme Court,” Chief Justice Teehankee 
seeks to restore confidence in the judiciary, writing,  
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If under the past unlamented regime, the spirit of the laws was lost in the 
convolutions of fine rhetoric, and found its voice expressed only in 
seemingly futile dissents, now this spirit is again enthroned in all majestic 
splendor in the institution of the Supreme Court that has been known as 
the citadel of truth and justice.
411
 
 
With such expanded powers of judicial review, the Supreme Court could reclaim its title 
as the guarantor of justice and regain its role within the system of checks and balances. 
The Philippine people hoped that with such expanded powers, the Supreme Court‟s 
independence would be permanently guaranteed and no longer vulnerable to the 
manipulations of crisis regimes seeking to justify dictatorship as “constitutional 
authoritarianism.” 
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